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No. 3, March 1983

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Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language monthly journal SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences.

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U.S. REFUSAL TO MAKE NUCLEAR ARMS NO-FIRST-USE PLEDGE CRITICIZED

AU071120 Moscow SSHA No 3 in Russian (signed to press 14 Feb 83) pp 16-26

[Article by M.A. Milshteyn: "On the Question of Not Being the First To Use Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] Nine months ago the Soviet Union announced from the forum of the second special session of the UN General Assmebly on disarmament that it unilaterally assumes an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear arms. It is known that other nuclear powers have not followed the example of the Soviet Union.

On 22 December 1982--in their appeal "to the parliaments, governments, political parties and peoples of the world," which was unanimously adopted at their joint festive session--the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet confirmed once again that "in accordance with its unilaterally assumed obligation the Soviet Union will not be the first to use nuclear arms." They appealed once again to "the other nuclear powers to assume similar obligations." [Footnote: PRAVDA, 23 Dec 1982.]

In early 1983 the highest representatives of the Warsaw Pact member states, who gathered in Prague on 4 - 5 January for a meeting of their political consultative committee, stated in their political declaration: "...the participants in the meeting expect that after the unilateral assumption by the Soviet Union of the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear arms all those nuclear powers who have not yet done so will take a similar step." [Footnote: PRAVDA, 7 Jan 1982.]

At present the question of not being the first to use nuclear arms has become the subject of a broad and comprehensive discussion in the West, and particularly in the United States. A heated discussion of this subject is underway, with prominent statesmen, public and political figures giving their opinion on radio and television and in the pages of newspapers and magazines. [Footnote: See for example: FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Spring, Summer and Fall 1982; FOREIGN POLICY, fall 1982, No 48.] Interest in the problem is not only not subsiding but, on the contrary, growing, which is, of course, not accidental. This is partly explained by the fact that the assumption of the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear arms demands a revision of the NATO military

doctrine adopted approximately in the mid-sixties which is known by the name of "flexible response" and which contains, as one of its component parts, the concept of NATO's first use of nuclear arms.

The revision of military-strategic concepts which was made a long time ago and became habitual is generally a difficult and painful process, particularly when many of those who are responsible for elaborating and adopting these concepts are still bound by old dogmas and stereotypes and refuse to notice any new phenomena or accept them. They come out decisively and categorically against accepting the proposal of not being the first to use nuclear arms, saying that it would allegedly cause irreparable damage to the security of the NATO countries. In the words of U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger, "The impact of our containment means would be undermined if we declared that we would never under any circumstances be the first to use our weapons." [Footnote: NEWSDAY, 19 Oct 1982]

In May 1982 at the meeting of the foreign ministers of NATO countries this concept was once again approved as a component part of the bloc's military doctrine. A number of U.S. official figures and NATO leaders spoke against its abolition. Sometimes they are joined by those who are influenced by the broadly developed, well-organized and purposeful campaign directed against the North Atlantic bloc countries assuring the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear arms.

At the same time many sober-minded politicians and public and military figures have arrived at the correct and natural conclusion that the time has come to revise old strategic principles, whose initiators and supporters consider nuclear weapons a national means of policy and war and that to assume such an obligation would be an important contribution to curbing the arms race and averting a nuclear catastrophe. The discussion of questions of security policy has livened up in NATO. Political figures, scientists and military people are busily examining the question of whether the strategy of "flexible reaction" adopted in the late sixties is capable of also guaranteeing security in the future" as stated by the West German newspaper FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU of 8 August 1981.

The discussion around the problem of not being the first to use nuclear arms reflects like a mirror the struggle between two tendencies and two directions in world politics. On the one side are those who have accepted and loudly announced that there will be no winner in a nuclear war and that under the present conditions it is impossible to gain military-strategic superiority. They have presented an alternative to nuclear catastrophe by appealing for broad international cooperation in the name of preserving civilization and life on earth. They see the curbing of the arms race and the transition to disarmament, primarily nuclear disarmament, as the main task in the struggle for preventing war. On this basis they propose to assume an international obligation not to be the first to use nuclear arms in the interests of security for all.

On the other side are those who, while talking about the catastrophic consequences of nuclear war, in fact, continue to bank on gaining nuclear

superiority and do not budge one step from their strategic concepts adopted at the time when such superiority did actually exist. At the same time they are occupied with constantly searching for possibilities of making nuclear arms more "credible" and "acceptable" in their strategic plans under new conditions. In other words, the problem is once again how to reestablish the former U.S. superiority, the decision to deploy "Pershing-II" and cruise missiles in Europe as well as putting into service the "MX" nuclear missile systems are vivid proof of such intentions. The political declaration of the Warsaw Pact member-states says: "Their putting forward of new military programs is inseparably connected with the escalation of strategic concepts and doctrines-- 'the first disarming nuclear strike', 'limited nuclear war', 'protracted nuclear conflict' and others. All these aggressive doctrines, which are a threat to peace, are based on the caculation that it would be possible to win a nuclear war by being the first to use nuclear arms." [Footnote: PRAVDA, 7 Jan 1983]]

The Soviet Union's obligation not to be the first to use nuclear wapons is a logical continuation of the principled foreign policy course of the Soviet Union and a law-governed stage in developing the military policy and defense military doctrines of the USSR. As early as November 1976 the Soviet Union together with the other Warsaw Pact participants came out with the proposal to conclude a treaty on not being the first to use nuclear arms between all the states-signatories to the Final Act of the all-European conference. In response the West began to contend that the implementation of this proposal would allegedly increase the probability of a war with the exclusive use of conventional types of arms. Taking these considerations into account, the USSR proposed in 1979 to conclude an agreement on not being the first to use either nuclear or conventional arms. Such an agreement would in fact be equivalent to concluding a nonaggression pact between all the participants of the Helsinki Conference. However, both these proposals failed to meet with a positive response on the part of the West.

The Prague meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member states once again demonstrated the determination of the socialist countries to undertake urgent and effective measures to reduce the danger of war. Having confirmed its previous proposals regarding the dissolution of the two biggest military-political alliances--the Warsaw Pact and NATO--and, as a first step, the liquidation of their military organizations, it addressed the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty with a new proposal to conclude a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force and on maintaining peaceful relations which would be open for other states to join as equal participants.

At its plenary session the 37th session the UN General Assembly, which finished its work in December 1982, adopted a resolution in which it confirmed the necessity of concluding in the nearest future a worldwide treaty on the non-use of force in international relations. It is characteristic that during the voting the United States once again rejected the proposal to conclude this treaty. The resolution was adopted by 119 votes. Among the 15 delegations which had voted against it were the United States and 12 NATO countries, as well as Israel and Japan.

The Soviet Union's obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons is of universal nature. Still earlier the USSR expressed its readiness not to use nuclear weapons against those states which refuse to produce and acquire such weapons and do not have them stationed on their territory. Now the Soviet Union's obligation applies to all the states in the world without exception.

It is an important landmark in the struggle to prevent nuclear war, declare nuclear weapons illegal, stop their production and gradually reduce the supplies of them to the point of completely liquidating them. In other words this is a radical new step in the struggle for nuclear disarmament.

At the same time the Soviet Union's decision not to be the first to use nuclear weapons undoubtedly represents a historic move on its part, because it was made under conditions in which the NATO countries and, first and foremost, the United States make no secret of the fact that their military doctrine not only does not exclude the possibility of being the first to use nuclear weapons but is in fact based on this premise which is fraught with danger to all peoples and countries.

In this connection attention must be paid to the recently published latest report of the Pentagon and the U.S. National Security Council entitled "Directive in the Defense Sphere for the 1984-1988 Fiscal Years" which emphasizes once again that a most important element of the U.S. military strategy is the escalation of conflict to the level of nuclear war, asserting that the United States is capable of winning such a war. It follows from the report that the U.S. Armed Forces are aimed at dealing the first nuclear strike against the Soviet Union and its allies.

Of course, if other nuclear powers assume an equally clear and precise obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, this would in practice be equivalent to a total prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons and become, as the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Yu. V. Andropov emphasized in his report "The 60th Anniversary of the USSR", a really substantial contribution to the cause of averting nuclear war." (Footnote: PRAVDA, 22 Dec 1982)

It would seem that the urgency of such a step--particularly now, in the present situation--is evident. The majority of the countries of the world support it. This step is dictated by the sharp exacerbation of the danger of a nuclear war breaking out in connection with the incessant nuclear arms race.

At the same time quite a paradoxical (and extremely dangerous) situation has now taken shape in the world. On the one hand, many specialists agree that a nuclear war, on whatever level it may break out and whatever attempts are made to limit it, for example, to a certain territory or certain objectives or, finally, to the number of strikes, will--through the inevitability of the "escalation law"--develop into a universal nuclear war with all the ensuing catastrophic consequence. It is also generally accepted that if a nuclear war breaks out, it may destroy human civilization if not life on earth itself. At present very few sober-minded people would try to argue against the fact that in such a war there will altogether be no winner in the accepted sense, and those who are left alive would probably envy the dead.

However, the nuclear arms race not only continues with some strange obsessive-ness but it gathers even higher speed as even more up-to-date, sophisticated, destructive, and deadly mass-destruction weapons appear one after another in the arsenals of the nuclear powers. The sinister "progress" in the development and perfection of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery has at present reached a dangerous point.

This is demonstrated by every aspect of the nuclear arms race.

Let us take the problem of nuclear arms' proliferation as an example. In 1945 the United States was the only possessor of nuclear weapons. Scientists and specialists thought that a long time would pass before another country succeeded in discovering the secret of making nuclear arms and acquired the necessary potential for its production and instruction. However, the scientists and specialists made a serious mistake. Little time passed and nowadays there is not just one but at least five nuclear powers in the world. The secret of making nuclear weapons is not a secret any more, and it is not just the nuclear powers but several other countries as well that also have the industrial possibilities for its production. According to U.S. estimates, by the year 2000 as many as 31 countries will be capable of producing their own nuclear weapons thus the possibility and danger of the proliferation of nuclear arms may sharply increase. [Footnote: THE NEW YORK TIMES, 15 September 1982]

With the growth of the possibilities for the production of nuclear weapons the hotbeds of tension and conflict situations in the world also multiply. Reminders of this are, for example, the events in the Middle East, in the South Atlantic and in the south of the African Continent. Under the conditions of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, any such conflict can quickly develop into a catastrophe and make inevitable that which today seems unthinkable, if the proliferation of nuclear weapons is not stopped once and for all.

Another example is the process of amassing nuclear munitions and the means of their delivery. In 1945 the United States had only a few atom bombs at its disposal. At present, according to certain estimates, the world has accumulated between 40,000 and 50,000 units of nuclear munitions. (Footnote: "Common Security, a Program for Disarmament," 1982, p 16; U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 16 December 1982, p 58) This means that in the 37 years since Washington's first use of nuclear arms against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki the nuclear powers accumulated on average about 1,400 units of nuclear munitions a year or four nuclear charges a day. At present there is an equivalent of 3-7 tons of TNT for every citizen of the earth.

The quantity and variety of delivery means have also greatly increased. This process not only fails to become weaker but even continues to accelerate.

According to the American press, if the "MX" and "Trident" programs are carried out on time, the United States expects to bring its arsenal of strategic nuclear charges alone up to 20,000. If, as is planned, the "MX" and "Trident" missiles begin to be introduced some time in the second half of the eighties, then the growth of the quantity of strategic nuclear munitions in the United States will proceed at the rate of approximately 2,000 per year or 5-6 charges

per day. These are just stratetic means. The danger here is also predetermined by the policy which may be pursued under such conditions and which could objectively increase the danger of the breakout of a nuclear war. As regards nuclear arms this would mean to search for realistic possibilities of waging a "limited", "protracted" and other varieties of nuclear war and of scoring "victory" in such a war or of making this war harmless for the United States.

The "progress" in the development of nuclear weapons not only takes place in the sphere of building up the numbers of delivery means and warheads. Even more threatening is the problem of qualitative improvements. These go in every possibly direction: the delivery means are perfected, the weight of nuclear weapons is reduced, mini-nuclear weapons are produced, the production of neutron weapons has started, the number of MIRV's for strategic missiles is increased and their accuracy is greatly improved. In the making are new systems of weapons which would not only increase apprehensions with regard to acquiring the potential for a first (disarming) blow, but would considerably undermine, if not completely wreck, the system of controlling both the national technical and any other means [as published]. If such control is undermined, then the entire process of negotiations and agreements on the limitation of arms will be wrecked and suspicions, fear and insecurity will increase even more.

A well-known American historian and public figure and former U.S. Ambassador to the USSR, G. Kennan wrote: "The arsenals of the two greatest nuclear powers have reached proportions which exceed everything that can be imagined as being used in battle without causing a world catastrophe. Nevertheless, these arsenals continue to be built up instead of being reduced. Together with their growth, the threat of a catastrophe sparked off by an accidental mistake--made by a human, a computer or through misinterpreted signals--grows correspondingly. This threat is intensified by the technical progress which has the tendency to undermine the shaky equilibrium which, it can be said, existed up to now in the balance of forces." [Footnote: THE LOS ANGELES TIMES, 23 November 1982]

The main conclusion from everything mentioned above is that the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war has sharply increased and every limited use of nuclear weapons would develop into a general nuclear war.

Can the insane arms race be stopped after all, can the sliding down toward the precipice from which there is no return be averted? What should be done to prevent nuclear arms from being used and to generally ban their use? How can the degree of confidence measured between states be increased when this confidence has already been considerably undermined?

An important place among the realistic and effective measures which would stop the movement toward the dangerous point of unleashing a nuclear war belongs to the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear arms. From the political point of view, in the sense of its beneficial influence on the international situation and on East-West relations, the mutual assumption of such an obligation would be first of all reflected in strengthening the confidence between states and, as a result, in improving the international situation as a whole.

At present various proposals and ideas for expanding confidence measures have been and continue to be put forward. First of all, it is a matter of how to prevent the danger of an unexpected outbreak of war as a result of an incorrect evaluation of the situation, miscalculation or technical mistake under the conditions of the intensified nuclear threat and deteriorating international situation. "In view of the speed of action and power of modern weapons, the atmosphere of mutual suspicions is particularly dangerous. Even an absurd accident, miscalculation or technical fault may have tragic consequences." [Footnote: Andropov, Yu. V.: "The 60th Anniversary of the USSR", PRAVDA, 22 December 1982]

There are suggestions for improving the direct communication line between the USSR and U.S, for advanced notification on tests of new or training missiles, intensification of information exchange and so forth. The Soviet Union has put forward far-reaching initiatives envisaging the following: to ban the flights of heavy bombers and the cruising of aircraft-carriers belonging to the one side in agreed zones adjoining the other side's territory; to inform each other in advance of mass takeoffs of heavy bombers and forward-based aircraft; to establish zones for submarine missile carriers where all the antisubmarine activity of the other side should be banned. In other words, it is suggested to agree on steps that would--to a great extent and effectively as well--exclude the reasons for the emergence of dangerous crisis situations. [Footnote: PRAVDA, 2 January 1983]

A total or partial acceptance of these proposals would undoubtedly strengthen confidence and improve the general atmosphere in mutual relations. However, up to now all these proposals are still in the discussion stage. If assumed, the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear arms would give the green light to the implementation of these and other proposals. Of course, this would not yet signify that complete and unconditional confidence has been established between the sides but it would be a solid step toward applying a safety catch to nuclear arms, with fingers not being constantly kept on the trigger.

The assumption by all nuclear powers of the universal obligation not to be the first to use nuclear arms would undoubtedly have a beneficial influence on all the negotiations on arms limitation and reduction which are currently underway.

Such an obligation would be particularly beneficial for improving the political situation in Europe. It is known that the NATO concept of being the first to use nuclear arms primarily applies to Europe; therefore, it is precisely over Europe that the sinister shadow of this threat is constantly hanging. Under the conditions of an unprecedented concentration of troops and armaments, both nuclear and nonnuclear, the refusal to be the first to use nuclear arms would have a salutary effect on the entire system of relations between European states and open up greater scope for making bold decisions on substantially reducing the level of military confrontation and consolidating the military-political stability in the European region at lower levels of armed forces and armaments and lower military expenditures. It is also beyond doubt that to conclude such an agreement would contribute to lowering the level of nuclear confrontation in Europe, gradually reducing and, in the long run, eliminating the stimulus for the states to build up these armaments on the European continent and making the transition to nonnuclear strategy.

The Vienna negotiations on the mutual limitation of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe which have been going on for almost 10 years without any visible concrete results would receive, at last, the necessary positive impulse for concluding the agreement on a mutually acceptable basis and, in any case, on the basis of reducing the levels of military confrontation and strengthening confidence between the sides.

To assume the given obligation would also positively influence the Geneva negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on intermediate-range nuclear arms in Europe. Reaching possible mutually acceptable agreements at these negotiations as quickly as possible would stop, while it is still not too late, a new and extremely dangerous spiral in the arms race in Europe, a refusal to be the first to use nuclear arms would facilitate the decisions to reduce the intermediate-range nuclear arms and renounce the deployment of new types of nuclear means, which would be in the interest of the European peoples. What is more, such an obligation would contribute to achieving a truly zero option in Europe, that is renouncing the deployment of nuclear arms there, both intermediate-range and tactical.

All of this could not but have a beneficial effect on the negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic offensive weapons which, in turn, would establish an atmosphere of greater confidence and in the end facilitate the reaching of an agreement which takes into account the interests of both sides, that is, on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security.

To assume the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear arms would also contribute to reaching an agreement on imposing a complete and general ban on nuclear tests, since the stimuli for the qualitative improvement of nuclear arms would be weakened and those obstacles which are now piled up on the path to reaching such an agreement could be overcome more easily.

To make the principle of not being the first to use nuclear arms universally applicable would be beneficial for the implementation of numerous proposals on creating regional nuclear-free zones; it would undoubtedly contribute to strengthening the regime of nonproliferation of nuclear arms and limit the possibility of its "horizontal" and the speed of its "vertical" proliferation.

These are just a few--by no means all the--important political advantages to be gained from the countries' assumption of the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear arms.

This decision could also play an important role in the military sphere in consolidating the material foundations of international security.

D.F. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, USSR defense minister and marshal of the Soviet Union notes that as far as the Soviet Armed Forces are concerned, to assume an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear arms "signifies that now during the training of the armed forces even greater attention will be devoted to the tasks of preventing a military conflict from developing into a nuclear one, and these tasks in all their variety will become an obligatory part of our military activity." [Footnote: PRAVDA, 12 July 1982] In the interest of fulfilling the assumed obligation a

more rigid framework is being established in training the troops and staffs, in determining the composition of arms and in organizing even tighter control over nuclear arms which would fully guarantee the exclusion of an unsanctioned launch of any type of nuclear weapons, from tactical to strategic.

Of course, if the other nuclear powers assume a similar obligation, the arsenal of measures could be substantially expanded and would pursue not only the aim of eliminating the threat of the first use of nuclear weapons, but also that of eliminating war as such. It seems that a whole number of measures would be required for the implementation of the assumed obligation, measures which would in one way or another touch upon all the spheres of the nuclear powers' military activity. Of course, this is not easy to do; serious efforts and--what is more difficult--a corresponding readjustment of psychology and the entire strategic thinking would be required.

The nuclear age, which has continued for almost 40 years, is not only connected with the accumulation of enormous nuclear potentials and with the presence of the threat of total destruction, but also with the elaboration and adoption of various military-strategic concepts and concrete plans for using nuclear arms, concepts and plans that are very difficult to abandon. First of all a revision of NATO's military-strategic views and concepts of being the first to use nuclear arms and a gradual transition from nuclear to nonnuclear strategy with all the ensuing consequences would be required.

As far as the sphere of military development is concerned, it seems that the assumption by the nuclear states of an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear arms would, on the whole, limit the programs of developing and perfecting nuclear arsenals and, first and foremost, all military programs connected with acquiring the so-called "counterforce" potential (that is, the very destabilizing systems which bring about the fear of the possibility of acquiring the potential for a first disarming strike. Such an obligation would also make it easier to reach agreements on the limitation and reduction of nuclear arsenals at the negotiations which are underway. More favorable conditions for concluding an agreement on freezing the arms race both qualitatively and quantitatively would be created.

At the same time the renouncement by all nuclear powers of the first use of nuclear weapons would also have a containing effect on the elaboration and adoption of various military-strategic concepts which could be interpreted as concepts of the first (disarming) strike. In any case they would have to be strictly in agreement with the principle of not being the first to use nuclear arms, expressing formally and essentially the idea of using nuclear weapons only in response to nuclear aggression and also envisage a quantitative reduction and limitation of the qualitative perfection of the systems which have been commissioned. Many serious misunderstandings connected with a wrong understanding or interpretation by the sides of each other's strategic concepts as well as incorrect mutual evaluations of each other's plans and intentions could be eliminated.

The main objections expressed by the representatives of the NATO countries against assuming the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear arms

concern the fact that this obligation would allegedly lead to a drastic weakening of the security of their countries and the bloc as a whole.

What is the essence of NATO's strategic concept? According to the Pentagon report of 1979, "the U.S. and NATO strategy envisages the possibility of being the first to use nuclear weapons, if this is necessary." [Footnote: Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 1980, Wash, 1979, p 86] Besides, prominent West German specialists such as K. Kaiser, director of the Bonn Foreign Policy Institute; G. Leber, former West German defense minister; A. Mertes, CDU Bundestag deputy and F. Schultze, former commander of the NATO Armed Forces in Central Europe specified in an article published in the FOREIGN AFFAIRS magazine: "The only possible situation is when a major offensive of the Warsaw Pact conventional forces cannot be stopped by conventional forces alone so that NATO will be forced to make limited use of nuclear weapons--small in scale and in small amounts, probably just a warning explosion." [Footnote: FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Summer 1982, p 1161] Recently this was confirmed once again by B. Rodgers, commander in chief of the Joint NATO Armed Forces in Europe: "In case of conflict we reserve the right to be the first to use nuclear weapons." [Footnote: DIE WELT, 30 November 1982]

It is believed that a "limited" use will not lead to the development of a major nuclear conflict. In this connection all hopes are pinned on "both sides being extremely careful." [Footnote: FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Summer 1982, p 1162]

The first argument maintains that the Warsaw Pact countries allegedly possess conventional arms superiority over the NATO countries which, in case of an aggression from the Warsaw Pact, it will not be able to oppose it with conventional forces and will therefore have to threaten with the first use of nuclear arms. And this is not just a threat. To all appearances there existed and continue to exist concrete plans by the United States and NATO to be the first to use nuclear arms.

The second argument says that to reject the concept of the first use of nuclear arms is adopted by the North Atlantic bloc will lead to breaking the link between NATO's nuclear weapons in Europe and the possible use of strategic nuclear weapons by the United States against the USSR.

As far as the third argument is concerned--which is not spoken or written about, but which can be guessed,--it asserts that the United States and its NATO allies are still hoping to upset in one way or another the existing equality in the nuclear sphere and gain superiority, after which the concept of the first use of nuclear arms will acquire new strength.

These are the main arguments adduced by the supporters of preserving the present NATO concept and renouncing the assumption of the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear arms. What can be said of these "arguments"?

Enough time has passed for the peoples of Europe and the world to convince themselves that the Warsaw Pact member states not only do not harbor any aggressive plans and intentions but that such plans would be contrary to the very nature of these states. The Warsaw Pact member states never threatened any state or group of states with aggression. What is more, they have more

than once proposed to the NATO countries--and confirmed their position, as was mentioned before, this January--to conclude a nonaggression pact between those two alliances and liquidate on a mutual basis their military organizations or disband them altogether. This proposal was, however, rejected by the NATO bloc.

The question of the correlation of conventional forces is particularly complex. This complexity is determined not just by the factual aspect, namely by the lack of mutually acceptable criteria for comparing different structures of armed forces, different tactical-technical data on the weapons of both sides and imponderable factors such as the morale of the troops, their combat training and so forth. The complexity is also determined by another important aspect of the problem which can be defined as traditional-psychological. The false idea of the Warsaw Pact countries' superiority in conventional forces was established a long time ago and is intentionally supported and in every possible way cultivated among broad Western circles by the bourgeois propaganda. This opinion is often taken for granted in the Western countries without any critical analysis or evaluation. Meanwhile, figures and facts attest that an approximate equality in the conventional arms sphere was established and now exists between the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO.

The existence of an approximate equilibrium has often been admitted by many political and military figures of the West, particularly by those who are well aware of the essence of this problem. A publication of the London International Institute of Strategic Studies concerning the evaluation of the balance of conventional forces between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries notes that such an evaluation "by way of comparing the numbers of combat units or armaments contains many elements of a subjective approach. Since the Warsaw Pact organization enjoys superiority in some spheres and NATO in others, there is no genuinely satisfactory method of comparing these asymmetrical advantages." The conclusion is drawn that "no side has the necessary forces to score a victory." [Footnote: The Military Balance 1982-1983. L., 1982 p 131] (J. Lynn), the 1978-81 head of the U.S. delegation at the Vienna negotiations on the mutual reduction of armed forces and arms in Central Europe, who, it may be supposed, is well aware of the true state of affairs, writes: "The NATO armed forces have at present serious advantages in certain spheres... the balance of forces definitely does not look as disadvantageous to the West as is often supposed." [Footnote: FOREIGN POLICY, Fall 1982, pp 43, 47]

As D.F. Ustinov said in connection with the correlation of conventional armed forces: "...The Warsaw Pact exceeds NATO in some types of forces and means whereas NATO exceeds the Warsaw Pact in other types...on the whole an approximate balance of conventional forces is also evident." [Footnote: PRAVDA, 7 December 1982]

Therefore this "argument" as well (of the existence of a superiority in conventional forces on the part of the Warsaw Pact), an argument needed to justify the necessity to adhere to the concept of being the first to use nuclear weapons, is as groundless, far-fetched and falsified as the "argument" of the threat of aggression on the part of the Warsaw Pact member states.

Of course, the level of confrontation of the two military groupings is still high and the peoples of Europe expect their security to be consolidated not on the basis of this level being raised but rather by way of its being gradually lowered.

As far as the question of the possibility of a "limited" nuclear war or the "limited" use of nuclear weapons is concerned, as noted by Yu. V. Andropov, "One must indeed be blind to the realities of our age not to see that whoever and wherever the nuclear hurricane blazes up, it will inevitably get out of control and cause a universal catastrophe. Our position in this question is clear: A nuclear war cannot be allowed, neither small one, nor a big one, not a limited one, nor a total one." [Footnote: PRAVDA, 22 December 1982]

There is only one conclusion to be drawn from everything stated above: The NATO concept of being the first to use nuclear weapons is hopelessly outdated and instead of providing security it creates an atmosphere of uncertainty and intensifies the threat of the outbreak of a nuclear war.

However, it would be incorrect to reduce the entire problem of not being the first to use nuclear arms to the question of abolishing the abovementioned NATO concept. Undoubtedly, the renunciation of this concept would be an important step toward normalizing and stabilizing the entire European situation. However, this is only part of the problem.

We are talking of renouncing the first use of nuclear weapons as a whole, whether strategically or regionally, before or after the start of a combat action with conventional means or with the aim of dealing a disarming strike, with only "limited" aims as a demonstration, or in the interest of hitting concrete objectives. We are talking about putting the first use of nuclear arms outside the law--excluding it from politics and from concepts, from concrete military plans and from the training of troops and staff, not allowing even "symbolic scenarios" during training and maneuvers and the search for the solution of this problem. What matters is to classify the first use of nuclear arms as a severe crime against mankind and to consider nuclear arms--as long as they are still in service--as merely a means of responding to nuclear aggression, a means of nuclear retaliation.

However, the meaning of renouncing, finally, any use of nuclear arms lies of course in renouncing, finally, any use of nuclear weapons whatsoever. The way to this undoubtedly lies, first and foremost, in renouncing the first use of nuclear arms. This corresponds to the interests of security of all the countries and peoples in the world.

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FRG RESISTS REAGAN ANTI-DETENTE POLICY

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[Article by I. D. Yevgrafov: "The Lessons of Detente: Washington and the Eastern Policy of the FRG"]

[Text] "The 1970's, which were marked by detente," General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yu. V. Andropov said in his speech at the CPSU Central Committee plenum of 22 November 1982, "were not, as some imperialist officials are now implying, an isolated incident in mankind's difficult history. No, the policy of detente is not in any sense a bygone stage. The future belongs to it."¹

People in the United States have a different opinion of detente. "In Ronald Reagan's Washington, detente has become a swear word," the U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT remarked in May 1982. "Today the administration views relations with the Soviet Union in light of competition, and not cooperation. Some top-level officials have even advocated some form of economic and political war."²

We should add that they have not only advocated this, but are quite energetically striving to undermine detente, escalate the arms race and heighten international tension. In essence, the form in which U.S. foreign policy is now being declared and conducted is nothing other than an attempt to cancel out the positive results of detente and return the world to the days of "cold war."

But President Reagan and his associates do not want to make their "flight into the future" a solo flight and are insisting that their allies come along. Washington is making every effort to involve its NATO partners in the arms race and in the economic war against the socialist countries. Furthermore, it is trying to carry out its own far-reaching military and strategic plans at the expense of the West Europeans, which was attested to by the pressure exerted by the U.S. administration on the West European countries last summer and fall in order to impede the construction of the gasline from Siberia to Western Europe.

Washington has tried to further its plans by launching a broad propaganda campaign to convince the West European public of the "danger of detente," making use of the notorious myth of the "Soviet threat." American critics of

detente assert, as former President R. Nixon wrote in the NEW YORK TIMES, that "detente was a costly error" and that "the only safe alternative is to restore U.S. nuclear superiority, limit contacts and try to smother the Soviet economy."³ Professional propagandists in the United States have created the myth about the "Trojan horse" of detente," implying that the West had strengthened its ideological opponent and increased its economic and military power by making efforts to normalize relations with the socialist countries. In this context, detente looks almost like a "gift" to the socialist countries from the capitalist ones.

The majority of West Europeans, however, are against the arms race and the threat of nuclear war and are in favor of negotiations with the USSR, active economic cooperation between East and West and the relaxation of international tension. The West European public values the achievements of previous years in the area of detente and cooperation.

Therefore, Washington's foreign policy is conflicting with objective international trends and is an anachronism in today's world.

Attempts to bring about changes in the foreign policy of the FRG, whose new Eastern policy once played a positive role in the process of international detente, occupy a special place in U.S. plans.

The complex of U.S.-FRG interrelations, which includes elements of integration and disintegration, the evolution of their views on the USSR and other countries of the socialist community and the causes and motives of the reversal in foreign policy doctrine and practice in the direction of detente are all of considerable interest today, now that those on the banks of the Potomac have resumed their course of confrontation and arms race escalation and are making plans for nuclear war.

The economic and political potential of the FRG has given it a key position in Europe. Its approach to questions of war and peace, detente and cooperation, friendship and security affects the entire political atmosphere in Europe. "Relations with the FRG are part of the Soviet Union's diverse and essentially global ties. But they are an extremely important part.... The state of relations between the FRG and USSR is a sensitive indicator of international detente and peaceful coexistence in Europe, and even outside Europe."⁴

A retrospective analysis of postwar development indicates that ruling circles in the United States and West Germany, despite the legacy of the war, quickly came to a "friendly understanding," and that the main reason for this was the desire to change the principal result of World War II--the stronger international position of the Soviet Union and the newly created world socialist system. The alliance was of particular value to both sides. West Germany became the United States' main militaristic instrument of anti-Soviet and antisocialist policy and "a major military force which, along with the atom bomb, must not be allowed to escape control."⁵ Militaristic ruling circles in West Germany saw the United States as a middleman and a last resort in carrying out their revanchist plans.

American imperialism and West German revanchism combined to make the FRG the only state in Europe which spent years demanding the revision of the results of World War II and which subordinated its domestic and foreign policy to the goal of revenge. The notorious "Halstein Doctrine" declared the claims of West German revanchists to be the sole representatives of the entire German people and demanded the severance of diplomatic relations with any country recognizing the GDR (this doctrine did not apply to the USSR). The FRG's Eastern policy in the 1950's was based on the hope of "reuniting Germany within the 1937 borders,"⁶ which, according to the West German leaders of that time, could be accomplished only through a strong alliance with Washington.

After the creation of the North Atlantic bloc, the United States and the FRG essentially became the chief partners in this aggressive alliance against the socialist states. In accordance with the Paris agreement signed under U.S. pressure in October 1954, the FRG won the right to keep an army of half a million soldiers and permission to produce its own conventional weapons.

Washington was happy to have an ally in the center of Europe which opposed all peaceful initiatives by the USSR and other socialist countries, declared the communist party illegal and had the most capable West European army aimed against the East. Bonn, where the FRG government was headed by K. Adenauer at that time, was happy to have Washington's support for all of its pan-German ambitions and its help in turning the FRG into the vanguard of imperialism on the European continent.

The cancellation of the United States' atomic monopoly by the Soviet Union, the launching of the first artificial earth satellite in 1957, which demonstrated the economic, technical and military successes of the USSR, the growing strength of the socialist community and the victories of national liberation movements in the 1960's all made significant changes in the international situation. The USSR's new ability to deliver a retaliatory nuclear strike at the United States and its allies nullified the strategy of "massive retaliation" and forced the more flexible American politicians to consider the need for foreign policy adjustments.

The historical facts of the two past decades provide irrefutable proof that U.S. and FRG ruling circles had to agree to the policy of detente for several serious objective reasons.

For the United States this move was dictated by the severe crisis of the policy of global interventionism, the failure of the American aggressive adventure in Vietnam and the reduction of its foreign policy capabilities due to the change in the balance of power between the socialist and capitalist worlds and the establishment of military parity with the USSR. For the FRG and other West European countries, the relaxation of international tension created new conditions for their pursuit of a more independent foreign policy, their freedom from American wardship and the restoration of the traditional ties between the Eastern and Western parts of the continent. Economic considerations played a significant role. The policy of the United States and FRG was also influenced by the growing public demonstrations against the cold war and the arms race.

The changes in U.S. and FRG policy in the late 1960's and early 1970's coincided with the change of governments in these countries. Furthermore, it is indicative that the Republican candidate for the presidency in 1968, R. Nixon, and the Social Democratic candidate for the chancellorship in 1969, W. Brandt, campaigned and won the elections on the platform of changes in foreign policy. Nixon announced that it was time to move from the "era of confrontation" to an "era of negotiation" with the USSR. Brandt reaffirmed his adherence to the principles of the new Eastern policy in an official statement on 14 January 1970.

Under the influence of the energetic initiatory moves of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community, the objective tendencies in world development became fully evident: The imperialist states which had been chiefly responsible for international tension in Europe and the rest of the world for many years after the war, the United States and the FRG, each with its own subjective interests and aims, had to join the movement for international detente. The common objective interests of the socialist and capitalist states with regard to the prevention of nuclear war became an important political prerequisite for the energetic development of detente with the participation of Washington and Bonn.

The U.S. and FRG approaches to detente were not identical and they did not begin implementing it in unison. It was precisely against the background of detente that conflicts, which had previously been hidden by the screen of "Atlantic solidarity," acquired distinct outlines.

It is a well-known fact that under the conditions of the general crisis of capitalism the relations between bourgeois states are distinguished by two conflicting, simultaneous tendencies--the tendency toward integration, engendered by common class interests and goals and increased economic interdependence, and the tendency toward disintegration and the exacerbation of contradictions resulting from conflicting economic and political interests. As far as the United States and FRG are concerned, this dialectical unity of opposites can be seen quite distinctly during the initial stages of detente.

In the second half of the 1960's the FRG already accounted for 8.6 percent of all world capitalist industrial production after it had overtaken England, almost doubled France's output and acquired the strongest economy in Western Europe. By that time the FRG was producing 35 million tons of steel and 3 million automobiles and ranked second among the world's trade powers. Its share of world capitalist exports was 11 percent while the U.S. share was 16.6 percent. West German monopolies grew much stronger and took the second place among the gigantic capitalist associations: 20 of the 200 largest monopolies in the world were West German.⁷ For the first time in the history of relations between Washington and Bonn, the West German monopolistic bourgeoisie felt strong enough to resent the status of a "junior partner." Chancellor K. Kiesinger (1966-1969) announced: "We have already stopped regarding the United States as an older brother to whom we run whenever we are in trouble."⁸

W. Brandt was one of the first statesmen in Western Europe whose views evolved perceptibly under the influence of changes in world developments and public

opinion. He repeatedly advocated "good relations" with the West and the East.⁹ When he became the Kiesinger government's vice chancellor and minister of foreign affairs in 1966, he stressed in official statements: "I put the improvement of relations with the USSR first and see no need to isolate the GDR for governmental purposes."¹⁰ Brandt publicly advocated the signing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In October 1969 he became chancellor, heading a coalition government of Social Democrats and Free Democrats. At that time, the FRG began to implement a new Eastern policy and became actively involved in the process of detente.

On 24 November 1969 the USSR and United States ratified the nonproliferation treaty and the FRG signed it 4 days later. There is no question that this was an intelligent move on the part of the new government, attesting to the triumph of realism in an area which had been a source of tension in Europe for several years. At around the same time the FRG Government suggested to the USSR that the earlier exchange of views on nonaggression be continued in Moscow. These talks were resumed on 8 December 1969.¹¹ The first contacts between the FRG and the GDR on the governmental level also began at this time. However, when W. Brandt explained the essence of his new Eastern policy on 14 January 1970 and said it would be necessary to "win trust in the East," influential circles in the United States responded to this idea with suspicion and without any particular enthusiasm.

The U.S. view of the FRG's new Eastern policy was not clear-cut. President Nixon, who had named "constructive talks" with the USSR and other socialist countries as one objective of American policy, had only limited praise for Bonn's steps to normalize relations with the USSR. Secretary of State W. Rogers said at that time that "the United States applauds all FRG initiatives to improve relations with the East in the hope and certainty that this will not undermine NATO in any way."¹²

Although the U.S. assessment of Bonn's new Eastern policy appeared to be positive, Washington tried to influence the scales and rates of FRG talks with the USSR and other socialist countries. It wanted to represent the interests of the entire West in the projected "constructive talks" with the USSR. American government officials felt that the FRG was "running ahead" in the development of East-West relations by taking steps to normalize relations with the Soviet Union and other European socialist countries.

The United States hoped that the FRG's new Eastern policy would be conducted within the regional policy framework. This would have been consistent with the "Nixon Doctrine," which stipulated talks on different levels: global (U.S.-USSR) and regional (Western Europe-Eastern Europe). The development of any West European initiatives on the regional level should transpire, in Washington's view, under American control and fit into NATO strategy. Bonn informed its American partner that the United States was placing too much emphasis on the central "balance of power" (that is, Soviet-U.S.), and not enough on the European "balance of power" because Washington was being distracted at that time by Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

The FRG's appeal to the East, according to American politicians, was a "breach of discipline" in NATO and undermined U.S. hegemony in the bloc. "The

initiatives of France and the FRG in talks with the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe gained our reluctant support in a fairly tense and cool atmosphere," American researcher D. Calleo wrote.¹³ At the same time, the possibility of the normalization of Soviet-American relations aroused equal concern in FRG revanchist circles: Friction in Soviet-U.S. relations allowed West German imperialism to take advantage of conflicts, act in the capacity of a "third force" and strive to earn political, economic and military dividends in this way.

Therefore, both sides obviously had their own "pros" and "cons" in the question of the normalization of relations with the USSR and there was no unanimous opinion regarding the rates and scales of impending changes.

The international situation at the beginning of the 1970's proved that the authority and political prestige of the FRG could be heightened only through the normalization of relations with the countries of the socialist community and the abandonment of all attempts to conduct a policy of force as a means of settling disagreements between states belonging to different political systems. The new Eastern policy presupposed a higher place for relations with the socialist world in the system of FRG foreign policy priorities, and this diminished the ability of the United States to influence West German foreign policy to some degree. It reduced the FRG's dependence on the United States and brought its political prestige in line with its level of economic development. In an assessment of this policy, the West German press commented that the situation had changed considerably since Adenauer's time, when Bonn had officially opposed any attempts to alleviate tension in U.S.-Soviet relations. "The sides have changed places," the RHEINISCHE POST remarked. "Now Bonn is taking the risk of an eastward probe and Washington is the wary bystander."¹⁴

People in Washington realized that pressuring Bonn could complicate the American Government's relations with an important NATO partner. This complication was made all the less desirable by the position into which the United States had been driven by its adventure in Vietnam, by the Middle East crisis and by the increased activity of national liberation movements in Africa and Latin America. Besides this, Washington and Bonn had to consider the acknowledgement of sociopolitical realities in Europe in full, because their partial acknowledgement, on which the United States once relied, could not serve as a basis for the normalization of relations with the socialist countries, and the refusal to acknowledge them would return American policy in Europe to the deadlocks of the cold war. In addition, the United States was already conducting serious talks with the USSR on the mutual normalization of relations. People in Washington knew that any attempts to stifle the positive features of the FRG's new Eastern policy under these conditions and to put a freeze on detente in Europe would certainly impede the conclusion of agreements of fundamental importance to the United States with the USSR.

On 12 August 1970 a treaty between the USSR and the FRG was signed in Moscow, and 2 years later it was put in force. The acceleration of detente in Europe had begun.

The signing of the Moscow treaty was the result of a long and persistent struggle by the Soviet State and other Warsaw Pact countries to eradicate the consequences of World War II in Europe, reinforce postwar realities and consolidate peace and security on the European continent. The signing of the treaty essentially signified acknowledgement of the bankruptcy of NATO's policy of pressure on the socialist countries. This treaty and subsequent Soviet-FRG and Soviet-U.S. treaties and agreements clearly stipulated the international legal bases of the process of detente, marked the beginning of a new stage in the development of interrelations between states with differing social structures in Europe and established important prerequisites for broader and deeper detente throughout the world.

This process became perceptibly more intense in Europe in the early 1970's and gradually extended to the entire range of relations between the socialist and capitalist countries. This was followed by the first practical steps on the American side. Washington accepted the Soviet proposal of talks on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons, which began at the end of 1969. G. Ball, U.S. under secretary of state in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, later wrote that the FRG's new Eastern policy foreshadowed the Soviet-American talks and "evoked enough confidence to encourage President Nixon to continue his summit-level diplomacy."¹⁵

On 7 December 1970 Poland and the FRG signed a treaty on the bases for the normalization of mutual relations in Warsaw. The treaty paved the way for the positive development of Polish-West German ties. It was a legal acknowledgement of the territorial and political realities in Europe and represented complete and irreversible recognition of the inviolability of the Oder-Neisse border and a renunciation of FRG territorial claims.

The quadripartite agreement on West Berlin, signed by the USSR, United States, Great Britain and France on 3 September 1971, was an important step in the relaxation of tension in Europe and the improvement of the international climate. Its focal point was the signatories' pledge "to assist in the eradication of tension and the avoidance of complications in connection with West Berlin." Furthermore, it clearly stipulated that the Western sectors of Berlin "are still not a component part of the FRG and will not be governed by it in the future."¹⁶

The Soviet-American summit meeting in May 1972, at which time the document stipulating the "Fundamentals of Interrelations Between the USSR and the United States" was signed, was an important event in the evolution of the U.S. position on the relaxation of tension in Europe and Bonn's new Eastern policy. A communique on the results of the Soviet-American summit meeting commended the FRG's treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland, which were awaiting ratification in the Bundestag at that time.

On 21 December 1972 representatives of the GDR and FRG signed a treaty on the bases of relations in Berlin. It laid the foundation for the development of equitable relations between the two German states and promoted the international recognition of the GDR. The two governments pledged "to respect the independence of each of the two states in internal and external affairs."¹⁷

The signing of the treaty signified the FRG Government's renunciation of the "Halstein Doctrine" and its claim to represent all the Germans.

In fall 1973 the GDR and FRG became members of the United Nations. When GDR Minister of Foreign Affairs O. Winzer spoke at the 28th Session of the UN General Assembly, he stressed: "The UN membership of the German Democratic Republic, located in the heart of Europe, and the Federal Republic of Germany as two independent sovereign states with differing social structures represents a new and important step in the improvement of the European and international climate."¹⁸

On 11 December 1973 a treaty on the normalization of relations between the FRG and CSSR was signed, and on 21 December an agreement was reached on the establishment of West German diplomatic relations with Hungary and Bulgaria. Article IV of the CSSR-FRG treaty says that the sides "have no claims on one another's territory and will not make such claims in the future."¹⁹ In this way the shameful Munich agreement of 1938 was declared invalid.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which was held 30 July-1 August 1975 in Helsinki, began a new stage in the implementation of the policy of detente. The results of this conference summed up the positive changes that had taken place in the first half of the 1970's in East-West relations on the European continent and in international affairs in general.

The heads of state who signed the Final Act of the all-Europe conference included the leaders of the United States and the FRG--countries which traveled different roads, in pursuit of largely dissimilar goals and in line with different principles, to arrive at a recognition of the need for international detente and the construction of interrelations between East and West on a new basis.

A comparison of positive factors with alleged negative ones leaves no doubt that the United States and the FRG, just as all other countries, have gained only advantages from the development of detente. The persistent and consistent initiatives of the USSR and the countries of the socialist community truly made detente a long-awaited "gift" to the people of the world.

The implementation of the policy of detente considerably improved the international climate and established the prerequisites for the resolution of many complex problems in relations between states, especially the problems of arms limitation and disarmament. The problem of curbing the race for strategic arms entered the sphere of Soviet-U.S. talks and the first important results were achieved in its resolution. Trade, economic and cultural contacts between Western and Eastern states in Europe grew more active. They began to take an increasingly important place in the total group of relations between the capitalist and socialist countries. It was during the years of detente that the intensive development of scientific, technical and industrial cooperation took place. Between 1970 and 1980 Soviet commodity exchange with the capitalist countries increased 6.7-fold, reciprocal shipments took on greater variety and the legal basis of this trade was strengthened. Inter-governmental agreements and programs for the development of economic,

industrial, scientific and technical cooperation for 10-15 years or more were signed with the FRG, Finland, France, Italy, the United States, Great Britain and Austria.²⁰

The experience of the 1970's confirmed not only the expediency and promising possibilities of peaceful coexistence by states with differing socioeconomic orders, but also the need for a consistent struggle against its opponents. This was made particularly clear when the group of cardinal international issues began to include such difficult and largely new objectives as military detente and the cessation of the senseless, destructive and lethal arms race; the realization of detente in the economic, scientific, technical and humanitarian spheres; the spread of detente to other continents.

The need to retain the positive results of the united efforts of all peace-loving forces in the 1970's is still particularly strong today, now that the most aggressive imperialist forces are fighting an open battle against detente, now that reactionary forces, despite the lessons of past decades, have not given up their hope of reversing the wheel of history, undermining the position of the socialist world and suppressing the popular revolutionary liberation struggle by force, and now that Washington is taking more and more actions contrary to the spirit and letter of the Helsinki accords.

The current international situation, however, is quite different from the state of affairs two decades ago. The position of the more aggressive U.S. circles has become even more unstable both within the country and outside its boundaries. These groups have lost many of their economic and military advantages. But the main consideration is that Washington's hegemonistic line is evoking increasing opposition in the United States and in other NATO countries, including the FRG.

During the years of detente, certain segments of the FRG public realized that the continuation of cooperation with the USSR and other socialist states would be in the interest of both sides over the long range. For example, in one of his interviews when he was still chancellor of the FRG, H. Schmidt rejected the possibility of "isolating the USSR" and stressed that "the Soviet Union is a powerful state. It has allies which represent, as a whole, extremely great economic and...military potential, and for both of these reasons--significant political potential.... Attempts to isolate a world power seem to me to be absolutely adventuristic. Apparently, someone does not know much about the balance of power in the world."

Washington's clearly defined course against detente and its disregard for the sovereignty and interests of its allies have evoked legitimate alarm and dissatisfaction in Western Europe. This particularly applies to the FRG, whose optimistic view of the future is connected with detente and with its new Eastern policy. "A policy aimed at agreement and cooperation between East and West must constantly receive new momentum. There is no other road than the road of negotiation,"²¹ SPD Chairman W. Brandt said in an APN interview in connection with the 10th anniversary of the Soviet-FRG Moscow Treaty.

For more than 10 years the FRG based its relations with its Eastern neighbors on the belief that if Bonn had begun to copy all of Washington's foreign policy

zigzags, this would inevitably have caused West Germany to lose its independent policy, would have attached it more closely to the U.S. line and would have had a negative effect on the development of FRG relations with the countries of the socialist community. This is why the Washington officials' attacks on the policy of detente and Washington's current hard line in relations with the USSR have not received the kind of support in Bonn that its overseas partner apparently expected.

The reinforcement of the positions of West German capital, whose specific interests in the international arena are certainly not identical to American interests, is still stimulating the tendency toward an independent West German foreign policy.

In recent years, however, people in Washington have begun to worry that this process could cause the United States' privileged ally on the continent to refuse to take part in joint actions and could widen the rift between the United States and the FRG and between the United States and the rest of the European NATO countries. For this reason, these people are giving more thought to their military and economic presence in Europe and are appealing for class solidarity to influence official Bonn policy.

The Reagan Administration is still using trade and economic ties as a means of exerting political pressure on the FRG and the other West European countries. Washington has virtually asked its allies to stop all trade with the USSR. In particular, it tried to discourage them from participating in the construction of the pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe, although this project would ensure the delivery of 40 billion cubic meters of natural gas a year to the West European countries, including 10 billion to the FRG.

During his last official visit to Washington as the head of the FRG Government in July 1982, H. Schmidt criticized the American administration's discriminatory measures against the pipeline project. "The U.S. measures," he said, "are an infringement of the interests of the European countries and of their sovereignty." Furthermore, he underscored the importance of continuing the policy of detente, saying that "peace cannot be strengthened by means of confrontation.... Detente offers unlimited possibilities."²²

The Schmidt government continued to advocate detente, negotiations and the curtailment of the arms race until its last day in charge. It did not allow itself to be drawn into the abyss of sanctions and strove to continue the dialogue with the USSR. The SPD-FDP cabinet, however, decided to conduct technical preparations for the deployment of new U.S. missiles in the FRG and signed a number of new military agreements with the United States. The SPD-FDP government's support of the NATO decision on the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Western Europe shook the faith of thousands of members of both parties in the coalition as the bearer and promoter of the traditions of detente and caused--along with other political, social and economic factors--a rift in the coalition cabinet, and then its resignation.

One of the reasons for the resignation of the coalition, said Chairman H. Mies of the German Communist Party when he stated his views on the new coalition

government (CDU/CSU-FDP), headed by H. Kohl, which took charge in the FRG in October 1982, "was the crisis of the policy whose range of fluctuation stretched from detente to confrontation, from verbal assurances of loyalty to the cause of peace to the support of NATO's missile decision, from promises of social reform to social dismantling."²³

We could add that a significant role was also played by the clandestine maneuvers of Washington, which saw only one way of changing FRG Eastern policy radically and of "separating" it from detente--namely, by breaking up the SPD-FDP coalition and encouraging the Free Democrats to take the side of the opposition. "The adaptation to American militarist policy undermined the trust of the voters and destroyed the foundation on which it (the coalition--I. Ye.) made its appearance in October 1969," NEUES DEUTSCHLAND remarked.²⁴

The Kohl government took the same position as its predecessor with regard to the fulfillment of FRG contract obligations in the pipeline project and ignored Washington's objections. As a result, after encountering the firm and unanimous resistance of the West Europeans, the Reagan Administration had to cancel its sanctions in November 1982. However, it demanded that the West European governments curtail trade and economic relations with the socialist states, and this gave rise to a new outburst of indignation.

The complex and tense atmosphere in the FRG--a country which is simultaneously the United States' chief NATO partner and one of the USSR's main Western partners in matters of detente and economic cooperation--faced it with another choice. This choice will determine not only the future of the FRG, but also the stability of Europe, whose vital interests require normal relations between states, the establishment of the principles of peaceful coexistence by states with differing social structures, stronger mutual trust and the willingness to seek mutually acceptable agreements, and not new varieties of cold war.

Contemporary history proves that the logic of international development does not guarantee Washington the right to prevail over the FRG or any other West European country indefinitely in the capacity of a "senior partner." Under certain conditions and in the presence of goodwill, Bonn could have at least a restraining effect on extreme forms of U.S. policy and even set an example of consistent adherence to the process of international detente.

Chancellor H. Kohl said in an official statement of 14 October 1982 that his cabinet's main line in relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe would remain "an active policy of peace." At the same time, he called "loyalty to the North Atlantic alliance and friendship with the United States" the foundation of his government's policy. On 2 October 1982, the NEW YORK TIMES reported that "officials in the Reagan Administration clearly expressed their satisfaction" with the arrival of a "conservative government headed by Christian Democrats" in West Germany in fall 1982. This satisfaction was also expressed during H. Kohl's talks with Ronald Reagan at the time of his official visit to Washington in November 1982 as the head of the FRG Government.

This is not surprising. The Kohl government hastened to reaffirm its support of the NATO decision (of 1979) on the deployment of new medium-range U.S. missiles in Western Europe and the unconditional support for Washington's "zero option" in the Soviet-American talks in Geneva, although NATO's notorious plans for nuclear "re-arming" could make the West Germans the hostages of an American strategy that calls nuclear war "conceivable."

It appears that U.S. and FRG relations will now take shape in an atmosphere of the complex and contradictory accommodation of mutual interests.

The experience of the 1960's and 1970's proves that whenever sensible statesmanship prevails over artificial constructs and the rash reliance on force in the Western capitals, a broad "two-way street" is created, giving equal political and economic advantages to the socialist countries and the Western states, including the United States and the FRG.

The lessons of detente, which is supported by all sensible people on earth, dictate the need to defend the particular structure of political, economic, scientific and cultural ties between East and West and the positive experience of the "era of negotiation" that were legally secured in the Final Act in Helsinki in 1975. The statements in the act regarding relations between states are fully in the interest of the entire international community, and this certainly includes the security interests of the United States and FRG.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 23 November 1982.
2. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 24 May 1982, p 26.
3. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 18 August 1982.
4. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom. Rech'i i stat'i" [Following in Lenin's Footsteps. Speeches and Articles], vol 7, Moscow, 1979, p 303.
5. THE NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE, 8 August 1946.
6. "Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages," Bonn, 1949, vol 1, p 28.
7. SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1974, No 2, p 28.
8. DIE WELT, 18 August 1967.
9. See, for example, W. Brandt, "A Policy for Germany," Bonn, 1960.
10. "Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages," Bonn, 1967, vol 64, p 5305.
11. "Bulletin der Presse--und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung. Sonderausgabe," Bonn, 1977, No 109, p 114.

12. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, 4 May 1970, pp 565-575.
13. Quoted in: R. Osgood, "Retreat from Empire," Baltimore-London, 1973, p 209.
14. RHEINISCHE POST, 20 December 1970.
15. G. Ball, "Diplomacy for a Crowded World. An American Foreign Policy," Boston-Toronto, 1976, p 111.
16. "Diplomaticheskii slovar'" [Diplomatic Dictionary], vol III, Moscow, 1973, p 223.
17. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 9 November 1972.
18. Quoted in: "Mezhdunarodnyy yezhegodnik. Politika i ekonomika" [International Yearbook. Politics and Economics], Moscow, 1974, p 63.
19. "Diplomaticheskii slovar'," vol III, p 636.
20. PRAVDA, 6 December 1982.
21. Ibid., 3 June 1982.
22. Ibid., 23 July 1982.
23. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 4 October 1982.
24. Ibid., 21 September 1982.

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CAUSES OF DISAGREEMENTS WITHIN FOREIGN POLICY ESTABLISHMENT EXAMINED

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[Article by A. A. Kokoshin: "Types of Contradictions and Divergencies at the Upper Level of the Executive"]

[Text] Numerous facts in the activity of U.S. foreign policy mechanism, including its top echelon, attest to the existence within its framework of contradictions and divergencies as well as of conflicts growing therefrom. At time such conflicts have a noticeable effect on the decision and actions of the United States in the international arena. It seems that in analyzing the activity of this or that administration it is quite important to take into consideration the existence of different types of contradictions and divergencies in this particular administration in order to evaluate more accurately the practice of implementing foreign-political doctrines and concepts and the dynamics and nature of examining this or that question by the foreign political mechanism.

While concentrating his attention in the present paper on the questions of noncoinciding interests within the framework of the top echelon of the executive, the author at the same time takes into account that each administration has a particular approach to the main questions of foreign and domestic policy. This approach is determined both by the long-term class interests of the monopolistic bourgeoisie inside the country and in the international arena and by the particular views of the political elite during each concrete period of development of the internal and international situation. It is within these limits that the results of the influence of the contradictions and conflicts in the sphere of foreign-political activity, contradictions and conflicts within the administration, are usually confined.

The analysis of the activity of a number of postwar administration (J. Kennedy, L. Johnson, R. Nixon, G. Ford, J. Carter and R. Reagan) allows at the present stage of elaborating the given subject to differentiate between five types of contradictions and divergencies within the framework of the top echelon of the executive power. In the author's opinion, the suggested typology is applicable to the level of Cabinet members as well as to the directly following subcabinet level, since in many situations assistant secretaries (or chiefs of departments who are not Cabinet members) either become direct participants in the decisionmaking process at the highest level or greatly influence it.

[Footnote: The U.S. President does not usually make final decisions either at Cabinet meetings or at the sessions of the National Security Council. To solve major problems of military and foreign policy, working groups are often formed in which the leading role is played by figures of subcabinet level; it

is precisely recommendations coming from these groups which most often lay the foundation for the decisions made by the President. The activity of the so-called Washington group for special activities formed to prepare the President's decision in crisis situations can serve as an illustration of this type of group. While elaborating, for example, the plans for the U.S. invasion of Kampuchea in April 1970, this group comprised the President's national security adviser, assistant secretaries of state, the assistant defense secretary, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the CIA director, the chief of the JCS operational department and the deputy assistant defense secretary. [Zhurkin, V.V.: "SSHA and International Political Crises," Moscow, 1975, p 156]

The following types of contradictions and divergencies in the foreign policy sphere at the upper level of power are suggested for concrete examination:

- a) contradictions introduced into the administration from the sphere of clashes between the various groupings of the country's political elite as a whole;
- b) institutional (interdepartmental) contradictions;
- c) personal divergencies;
- d) divergencies between figures from the sphere of foreign policy and the expounders of the administration's internal political interests;
- e) divergencies on concrete foreign policy issues.

Contradictions, introduced into the administration from the sphere of clashes between the various groupings of the U.S. political elite are, first and foremost, a result of the deeply conflicting interests of several regional monopolist groupings. In the last 15-20 years the share of the monopolies in California, Texas and the Deep South has substantially grown in the U.S. economy and these monopolies are actively pressing for a corresponding role in the political life of the country, pushing aside the monopolists and political elite of the Northeast which is referred to as the "Eastern Establishment". [Footnote: See: Zorin, V.S. "America's Uncrowned Kings", Moscow, 1970 and Zorin, V. S.: "Monopolies and Washington," SSHA - EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1978, No 7-8]

After the "Eastern Establishment" lost (during L. Johnson's administration) its dominating positions in forming administrations, none of the regional groupings succeeded in achieving total domination in determining the composition of new administrations even if some grouping did succeed (through all sorts of agreements with other groupings) in placing its protege on the President's chair. This circumstance predetermines the presence within the framework of one and the same administration of representatives from different groupings of the country's political elite which have conflicting interests beyond the confines of the administration and are bearers of different political traditions and a different political culture.

Of course, a grouping of monopolies does not always have the possibility to demand of its protege to pursue only such a line in foreign policy which is advantageous exclusively to itself. However, it is possible to trace in the activity of most U.S. secretaries of state, defense and commerce ties with the private interests of some concrete regional political or economic grouping.

The clashes between A. Haig, former secretary of state in R. Reagan's administration (representative of the "Eastern Establishment") and the President's closest associates (Californians) E. Meese, M. Deaver and W. Clark can be regarded as a recent example of the conflict at the upper level of the executive power between the proteges of different regional groupings.

In the previous administration such as conflict was absent from the relations between Secretary of State C. Vance and the President's national security adviser Z. Brzezinski (both belonged to the "Eastern Establishment"). However, such a conflict obviously took place in the relations between these two figures and President J. Carter's closest general policy advisers (H. Jordan, B. Lance, G. Rafshun) and others. [Footnote: Immediately after J. Carter's victory in the 1976 elections, H. Jordan, organizer of Carter's election campaign, stated, reflecting the feelings of the southerners who were celebrating their victory, that if it turns out after the President's inauguration that C. Vance receives the post of secretary of state and Z. Brzezinski—that of the President's national security adviser, then this would mean that H. Jordan and his companions-in-arms have not achieved anything; he promised that the administration would have new people in key positions and, should this not be the case, he would resign. [D. T. Ziegler: "The Irony of Democracy," Monterey, 1981, p 308] However, it soon turned out that (H. Jordan) had obviously underestimated the strength of the "Eastern Establishment" at the time. He, among other Georgians in J. Carter's administration, was forced to accept the appearance in the administration of not only the figures mentioned above, but also of many other prominent representatives of the top monopolists and political elite of the Northeast.]

Institutional (interdepartmental) contradictions are conditioned by the presence of specific private interests from each of the main organs and departments whose heads often cooperate at the Cabinet level of administrations on questions of "national security." The private interests of departments have taken shape in the course of decades and no measures aimed at overcoming departmentalism in the approach to the most important issues of foreign and military policy (for example, forming the National Security Council and multiple reorganizations of this apparatus) have been able to eliminate these contradictions. Conflicts owing to this fact are in particular a result of contradictions between departments such as the Defense Department and the State Department, the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the CIA and the Defense Department (primarily the intelligence agency of the Defense Department). [Footnote: The following figures are members of the National Security Council: The U.S. President, the vice president, the secretary of state and the secretary of defense as well as—in an advisory capacity—the director of the CIA and the JCS chairman. Apart from departments whose heads are members of the NCS, the FBI, the Commerce, Trade and Energy departments, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the National Security Agency and a number of others are also related to the problems of "national security." [For further details see: Petrovsky, V. F.: "Doctrine of 'National Security' in U.S. Global Strategy," Moscow, 1980; and Filatov, A.K.: "U.S. National Security Council: Structure, Functions and Activity (1947–1980)," synopsis of thesis made by candidate, Moscow, 1981] A conflict of interests and views on a number of important political-economic issues can be noted between the State Department and the Commerce or Trade Department,

the State Department and the Agriculture Department and so forth (according to the author's calculation, there are 30-32 bilateral interdepartmental contradictions taking into account all possible combinations within the framework of the choice of departments related to "national security" policy). Each of these departments in turn diverges in its own way from the apparatus of the White House and, first and foremost, from the apparatus of the National Security Council.

In fact quite an important role in solving the questions of foreign and military policy (a role which is sometimes far more important than that played by those who are authorized by their official functions) is played by the President's confidential advisers on general-political and domestic-political issues, people who are formally not NSC members and are not in charge of any sphere of the U.S. activity in the international arena. [Footnote: In J. Kennedy's administration an important role in many foreign-political decisions was played by his advisers on internal affairs (K. O'Donnell and T. Sorensen) as well as his brother R. Kennedy, attorney general; in L. Johnson's administration in a similar part was played by J. Valenti and B. Moyers; in J. Carter's administration it was H. Jordan, G. Rafshum and J. Powell and in R. Reagan's administration--E. Meese, J. Baker and M. Deaver.]

During R. Nixon's administration the relations between the President's national security adviser, H. Kissinger on the one hand, and the secretary of defense, M. Laird, the secretary of state, W. Rodgers, and the CIA director, R. Helms, on the other, gave a striking example of institutional contradictions developing into a conflict. (In this connection at the state there were no essential divergencies between H. Kissinger and the figures mentioned above on any concrete foreign or military policy issues.) The substantial and--on a number of issues--constructive turn in foreign and military policy undertaken in the early seventies by R. Nixon's administration required a concentration of all the White House's efforts. This was dictated to a great extent by the striving to eliminate the foreign-political, intelligence and military bureaucracy from key decisions and the most important information, because this bureaucracy could not, due to its nature, change its approach to a number of principles of foreign policy and its working rhythm as fast as was required by the highest state leadership in the person of the President. [Footnote: In his article "Internal Structure and Foreign Policy" H. Kissinger wrote that, because of its nature, bureaucracy is not designed to implement any kind of creative new policy answering the needs of the state at a time when critical changes are taking place in international relations. Bureaucracy creates "standard operating procedures" and can be effective where everyday routine work is concerned. However, it begins to oppose the highest state leadership when the latter tries to find new approaches to problems of foreign policy and formulates a foreign policy course different from the previous one. (H. Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy" in AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, New York, 1974 pp 17-18)] Cutting the abovementioned departments and their heads off from making very important decisions on "national security" issues intensified their dissatisfaction with the style of work of the National Security Council apparatus headed by H. Kissinger and had a negative effect on their attitude to the important aspects of R. Nixon's and H. Kissinger's foreign policy.

When examining the questions of shaping foreign policy the existence of conflicting interests within the Defense Department between the departments dealing with the services of the armed forces (air force, navy and ground forces) must also be taken into consideration. Although the secretaries [ministri] heading these departments are not NSC or Cabinet members, they nevertheless have the possibility of reaching the highest level of military-political decisionmaking, even bypassing the secretary of defense.

The divergencies between the civilian leadership of the Defense Department appointed by the President and the top generals may also influence decision-making at the upper executive level. This was demonstrated particularly clearly during J. Kennedy's and L. Johnson's administrations in the relations between the secretary of defense, R. MacNamara, and the JCS members and later, during J. Carter's administration, in the relations between the secretary of defense, G. Brown, and the top military ranks (particularly in the navy.) [Footnote: Divergencies between the civilian and military leadership of the U.S. Defense Department are discernible in practically any administration regardless of the policy pursued by this or that Pentagon head. Thus M. Laird, for example, secretary of defense in R. Nixon's administration, tried to eliminate a number of elements in the planning-programming-budgeting system introduced by R. MacNamara, which was welcomed by most generals. However, the same Laird gave a lot of effort to preventing the JCS chairman from having direct access to the President, striving to obtain the exclusive right to inform the President on military matters. (H. Kissinger: "White House Years", Boston, 1979, p 44)]

The divergencies between the heads of the above-mentioned departments and the National Security Council apparatus usually do not manifest themselves immediately after the new administration begins to function. However, as early as after about a year of the administration's tenure the private interests of separate departments make themselves felt ever more strongly, which is reflected in the behavior of their heads, presidential appointees. Many department heads appointed during the change of the administration become dependent--in the process of mastering the apparatus entrusted to them--on the irremovable bureaucracy--preserver of the "institutional memory"--which is very well acquainted with the real mechanism of the functioning of the state apparatus, a mechanism largely incomprehensible to outsiders (this of course, does not refer to strong personalities, such as R. MacNamara and H. Kissinger.) If a political figure appointed to such a position wants to be a strong and prominent member of the administration and make himself known on a national scale and in the international arena, he must, first and foremost, take into his hands the real reins of leadership in his department and assimilate the stock of knowledge stored in the "institutional memory".

It must also be taken into consideration that in the United States, considerably more often than in other Western countries, political figures without any special knowledge or experience in the corresponding sphere are appointed as chiefs of departments concerned with the issues of "national security." In R. Reagan's administration this applies to the secretary of defense, C. Weinberger, who, in his previous governmental activity, was secretary of health, education and welfare and director of the Office of Management and Budget, as well as to the secretary of state, G. Shultz, former secretary of

commerce, and to W. Clark, adviser to the President for national security, who is a lawyer without any experience in diplomatic, military or scientific work with the exception of spending several months immediately beforehand as first deputy of the secretary of state. [Footnote: The level of W. Clark's preparation for international affairs is characterized by the dialogue which took place during a session of the Senate Commission on Foreign Affairs in February 1981 during the discussion of his candidature for the post of the first deputy of the secretary of state. For further details see: SSHA - EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 2 1982 p 55.]

The more successfully a new department head, appointed by the President, utilizes the "institutional memory" of the old-timers in the state apparatus, the more he becomes dependent on the irremovable officialdom. The more he becomes not so much a conveyor of the President's directives in his department than a conduit transmitting certain departmental interests to the highest Presidential level. From these positions the figures appointed to top cabinet posts also start interacting among themselves. From time to time the competing departmental organs attempt to limit the scale and sharpness of their competition in order to consolidate the most important coinciding and parallel interests with the aim of avoiding the risk of having the President make the decisions which may negatively affect their common interests. Department chiefs often conclude compromise agreements with each other in connection with the President's demands. With the active participation of their bureaucracy they sometimes bloc the arrival of this or that foreign-political problem at the presidential level, although the problem may well warrant it.

It must be noted that the role of the bureaucracy in implementing adopted decisions is even greater and this implementation is in most cases a far more complicated affair than the elaboration of the decision itself. According to the just remark made by A. George, a well-known U.S. specialist on the given problem, the enormous complexities of implementing foreign-political decisions adopted by the President often transform the declared course into "policy on paper" which in fact lies in the depths of the Washington bureaucracy a week or two after the statement has been made by the President or his spokesman. [Footnote: A. George: "Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy. The Effective Use of Information and Advice," Boulder, 1980, p 113.]

Personal divergencies and conflicts appear as a result of a clash of ambitions and temperments which in a way adds spice to the political struggle. Taking into account the fact that bourgeois politicians and statesmen have enhanced ambitions, it seems that in real politics the weight of the personal factor in conflicts at the highest U.S. executive level is fairly great. Many facts speak in favor of the personal conflict being more characteristic of the United States than of many West European states which have deeper traditions in the sphere of political etiquette. [Footnote: As Yu. A. Zamoshkin correctly observes, "...the traditional-individualistic model of success was not just an ideological declaration, it turned into a kind of hard imperative which is of great practical influence on the life orientation and day-to-day behavior of many people in the United States." (Yu. A. Zamoshkin: "Personality in the United States of Today", Moscow, 1980, p 28.)

The term "jungle fighter" coined by U.S. sociologist M. Macoby to define a widespread type of businessman, can be applied to many U.S. political figures with an exceptionally strong individualistic orientation. With this term M. Macoby defines that type of figure who considers everyone with whom he must come into contact either as an accomplice or as an enemy. "People of this type see life and work as a jungle, where you either eat or are eaten and the victors destroy those who are weak." [Footnote: M. Macoby: "The Games Man", New York, 1976, pp 52-53, 78-79.]

The kindling of personal clashes is to a great extent made easier by the constant communion of the administration's highest officials with the mass information media which are always ready to fan the sparks of personal divergencies and conflicts until they reach the proportions of a nationwide sensation.

An important source of personal divergencies lies in the different origins and social status of the state figures. While being on approximately the same level in the state and political hierarchy, they may differ considerably in their property status and the degree to which they belong to the cream of society. In the vast majority of cases those figures who have had to fight their way up to the top of the U.S. political leadership act more energetically and aggressively during intragovernmental clashes than those politicians whose path to a cabinet position was much shorter and easier owing to their wealth and the well-developed social and political connections of their parents and relatives.

Frequently, a personal conflict develops in a way from the conflicts of the abovementioned types. Contradictions between departments, transformed into conflicts between their heads, take their final shape as tense personal relations between the corresponding cabinet members. The same can be said about the role of contradictions introduced into the administration from the sphere of clashes between different groupings of the political elite. In the latter case the basis for the development of a personal conflict is the sharp contrast in the political culture of the given figures and, in a way, their cultural and psychological incompatibility.

However, personal conflicts can also arise in relations between figures who are divided by either institutional contradictions or the conflicting interests of opposing groupings in the ruling elite. A case of this type of conflict is exemplified by the relations between the former secretary of state, A. Haig, and Vice President G. Bush which were laid bare after the attempt on R. Reagan's life, when A. Haig hurriedly declared, without waiting for the--the absent--vice president to come back to Washington, that it was he, A. Haig, who at that critical moment had the reins of government in his hands. The appointment of G. Bush, immediately afterwards, to be in charge of implementing the policy under conditions to international crisis situations as well as of preparing the conference of the heads of states of the biggest capitalist countries in Canada magnified this conflict, because previously the State Department had been in charge of both functions." [Footnote: THE NEW YORK TIMES, 24 March 1981; NEWS BULLETIN, American Embassy, Moscow, 27 March 1981 pp 3, 5] The roots of the conflict between A. Haig and G. Bush, who belong to the same "Eastern Establishment" (the latter of course also greatly ramified economic and political connections in Texas) and who had not clashed in institutional

battles with the administration, are hidden in the extremely strong presidential ambitions of them both. A. Haig was incapable of dissimulating about these ambitions after the attempt on the life of R. Reagan and in a number of other situations.

The divergencies between the figures of the foreign-political sphere and those expressing the domestic political interests of the administration are close to the second type of those considered above (interdepartmental divergencies). These are also to a great extent of an institutional nature; however, in this case we are talking of the clash between departmental interests on another plane. The clash of personalities does not involve the question of leadership of this or that department in issues of foreign policy as such, but, rather concerns the correlation of the domestic and foreign-political tasks of the state and the correlation of the political and economic resources which Congress allocates for the solution of these tasks on the President's proposal. Such conflicts frequently take place in the relations between the secretary of defense and the director of the presidential Office of Management and Budget, for example: the military department in the person of its head strives for maximum allocations for the purchase and utilization of military technology, for payments to and allowances for military personnel and so forth, whereas the head of the OMB must coordinate these demands with the budget limitations and considerations of a general economic nature. [Footnote: OMB and the Pentagon: "Adversaries or Collaborators?" in DEFENSE MONITOR, 1982 Vol 11, No 2]

Conflicts between the OMB and the leadership of the Department of Defense occurred, for example, when the present secretary of defense, C. Weinberger, was director of the Office of Management and Budget (in R. Nixon's administration). At that time he was nicknamed Cap the Knife for cutting the budget appropriations for different departments, including the Department of Defense, overcoming the fierce resistance of M. Laird, who headed this department at the time, and the JCS. Acting in his way within the framework of R. Nixon's policy aimed at balancing the federal budget, C. Weinberger said at the time, "The presence of danger to security does not require an automatic increase in military spending to neutralize it. In short, the military budget should be considered not only in the light of that against which we must defend ourselves. The more means that are diverted from our wealth to defend it, the less wealth there is." [Footnote: R. Brownstein and N. Easton: "Reagan's Ruling Class. Portraits of the President's Top. One Hundred Officials," Washington, 1982]

Failure to understand the basic difference between C. Weinberger--as director of OMB in R. Nixon's administration--and C. Weinberger--as secretary of defense in R. Reagan's administration--created the illusions harbored by D. Stockman, director of Reagan's OMB, regarding the possibility of enlisting C. Weinberger's support for measures aimed at reducing the military spending of the administration, while at the same time increasing the effectiveness of military expenditures. [Footnote: Proceeding from "pure" administrative and economic logic, D. Stockman presumed, not without reason, that the military budget can be reduced by about \$30 billion a year without any damage to the exaggerated demands of "national security." This would contribute to considerably reducing the total federal budget deficit and to slowing down inflation. [ATLANTIC MONTHLY, December 1982, pp 40-53]

D. Stockman has clearly miscalculated. He came to grief in his attempts to reach an agreement with C. Weinberger on some limitations in satisfying the demands of the military department. The leadership of the Department of Defense, keeping in mind the group and private interests of the weapon-producing corporations and the soldiery does not want to take into consideration the country's general economic interests which, due to his position, should concern the director of the OMB. The position of the leadership of the Department of Defense was supported by President R. Reagan personally, who is more closely connected with the interests of the military-industrial complex than any other president in postwar U.S. history. In recent years conflicts often broke out, for example, between the leadership of the Department of Agriculture on the one hand and the leadership of the Department of Defense, the State Department and the apparatus of the National Security Council on the other, regarding the question of grain sales to the Soviet Union. In each such conflict situation the leaders of the Department of Agriculture came out against any measures limiting grain sales, thus opposing the embargo supporters from the organs and departments mentioned above. The reason for this does not, of course, lie in the fact that in the leadership of the Department of Agriculture there are always figures which are "less tough" vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, but rather in the fact that this department is very closely connected with the agricultural business and vitally interested in large-scale trade with the Soviet Union. The President's assistants for general-political and domestic-political issues often become allies of the Department of Agriculture in such conflicts, they remember that agro-industrial businessmen have enormous influence in a number of states and Congress and that the President is forced to take this into account.

Another example of such type of conflicts is the clash on the question of the joint Soviet-American declaration on the Middle East of 1 October 1977, a clash between President J. Carter's chief political assistant, H. Jordan on the one side, and the President's national security adviser Z. Brzezinski on the other; the latter was supported by the secretary of state, C. Vance, and, in a less open form, by the secretary of defense, G. Brown. In his open opposition to this declaration--the result of protracted diplomatic work by the Soviet and U.S. sides--H. Jordan proceeded from the assumption that if J. Carter pursued his Middle East policy in the spirit of this declaration, the administration would lose the domestic political support of a significant part of the very influential Jewish community.

The press most often focuses the public's attention on divergencies on concrete foreign policy problems. In this connection the significance of such divergencies in the general structure of relations within the framework of this or that administration is frequently overestimated, whereas the contradictions and conflicts of the types described above are altogether ignored. However, paradoxical it may seem at first sight, to over-emphasize precisely the conflicts on concrete foreign policy issues is often advantageous also for those administration officials who are discussed in the outlets of mass information media. The reason is that the vast majority of public figures arriving at top state positions in the organs of the executive, actually have no clear concepts on foreign-political and military-political problems. In their behavior as leaders of corresponding organs even those who enjoy a solid liberal reputation (or, on the contrary, a conservative one), apply a wide range of attitudes

to concrete foreign political issues, in which they are guided by departmental, group or private interests and motives concealed from the uninitiated.

Making efforts to achieve these private interests, which are far from identical with the general interests of the ruling class, the government figures strive to impart to their struggle the semblance of a principled nature and explain their clashes with the other members of the administration by the differences of opinion on foreign policy issues, on international relations or on the interpretation of foreign-political and strategic priorities. However, after a certain time their arguments on concrete issues, which mark their genuine private interests, become in themselves an important factor in the relations within the administration. These arguments become ensconced in the minds of both the conflicting sides themselves and of those who are associated with them. These arguments begin to lead a relatively independent life.

What was said above of the roots of conflicts on concrete foreign policy issues does not in any way imply that such conflicts may not be of an autonomous nature. U.S. Administration activities during the postwar period reveal a series of situations in which the contradictions on concrete issues between prominent government figures were hardly in any way connected with their different social origins or their belonging to one or the other political grouping or department, contradictions which did not spring from personal dislikes. The relations between G. Ball, deputy secretary of state in the administrations of J. Kennedy and L. Johnson and the President's national security advisers M. Bundy and W. Rostow, the secretary of state, D. Rusk, and the secretary of defense R. MacNamara, were of such a nature, for example. G. Ball was the only prominent figure in the U.S. executive organs in the mid-sixties who was against expanding the U.S. intervention and, later, against escalating the U.S. military aggression in Vietnam. G. Ball motivated his position by the argument that excessive attention devoted to Vietnam would divert enormous U.S. resources and strength from its relations with its West European allies, relations which he regarded as the chief and ever more complicated problem of U.S. foreign policy. Besides, G. Ball was sure that given the existing structure of interstate relations and the limitations imposed on the use of U.S. military power in Vietnam (first and foremost, in connection with the support given to the DRV by the Soviet Union) the United States was not capable of achieving the goals set by the administration. [Footnote: D. Halberstam: "The Best and the Brightest", Greenwich, 1972, pp.595-599]

The important differences of opinion on the Vietnamese problem and on the issues of U.S. foreign-policy priorities as a whole between G. Ball and the Secretary of State D. Rusk, could at least to a certain extent be explained by their ties with some regional groupings of the U.S. political elite. G. Ball represents the "Eastern Establishment" whereas D. Rusk is a southerner by origin although occasionally he was also "Eastern Establishment" oriented. As for the relations between G. Ball and M. Bundy, W. Rostow and R. MacNamara here this feature [of varying loyalties] was completely absent, since the last mentioned officials belonged to the same regional grouping of the U.S. political elite and were products of the same political culture as G. Ball.

In the Carter administration there was also a conflict of such type on the main U.S. military-political problems between the national security adviser, Z. Brzezinski, and the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, P. Warnke, who represented the United States at the Soviet-U.S. negotiations on strategic arms limitation. While occupying the above-mentioned posts, the latter supported a more realistic position in evaluating the strategic balance between the USSR and the United States and in questions of limiting strategic arms as well as in the approach to negotiations with the Soviet Union on important military-political problems. [Footnote: L. Shoup: "The Carter Presidency and Beyond. Power and Politics in the 1980's", Palo Alto, 1980, pp 147-148]

P. Warnke was known as a supporter of such an approach long before J. Carter invited him to occupy the posts mentioned above. At the same time, a place at the right wing of J. Carter's "foreign policy team"--particularly concerning questions of Soviet-American relations--had been quite justifiably predicted for Z. Brzezinski from the very beginning. A certain clarity of the positions of both figures even before they joined the administration significantly reduces the importance of the institutional factor in their conflicting relations to each other. It must be added that both P. Warnke and Z. Brzezinski belong to the "Eastern Establishment" and before joining the administration had close mutual contacts within the framework of the activity of the "Trilateral Commission" and the New York Council for Foreign Relations. They also had, as is often customary in the U.S. political elite, good personal relations in spite of significant divergencies on political issues.

The relations between A. Haig and C. Weinberger can be considered an example of how the contradictions introduced into the administration from the sphere of clashes between different regional groupings of the ruling elite are transformed into conflicts on concrete foreign policy issues. As a representative of the "Eastern Establishment" closely connected to the businessmen and political elite of Western Europe, A. Haig strove, till the end of his tenure as secretary of state, to have greater consideration given to the interests and attitudes of the main West European NATO partners of the United States in implementing the foreign policy of the Reagan administration. This was expressed in A. Haig's less extremist approach to the "gas for pipes" deal and to a number of other important issues. As for C. Weinberger, being first and foremost a protege of Californian businessmen and politicians chiefly oriented toward the Asian-Pacific region in their foreign ties, he proved to be a supporter of the most brutal pressure on the West European leaders on key issues of the relations between capitalist and socialist countries proceeding, from the position of openly subordinating the West European interests to those of the United States (in the interpretation of the Reagan administration).

The above typology of contradictions and divergencies with the upper echelon of the executive branch is sufficiently relevant. For various research purposes it can either be developed into a more detailed classification or used in its simplified version. Besides, the fact has not been taken into consideration that in the United States various groupings in both houses of Congress as well as non-government organizations, all sorts of committees of the ruling elite and so forth also participate in making foreign policy decisions.

On the whole it seems that the given classification of the contradictions and divergencies within the upper U.S. executive can be used as a component part of the coordinate system within which the foreign policy of any U.S. Administration is analysed and evaluated.

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CSO: 1803/8a

U.S. SPACE POLICY, STANCE AT 1982 UN SPACE CONFERENCE CRITICIZED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 83
(signed to press 14 Feb 83) pp 60-66

[Article by Yu. M. Kolosov: "The U.S. Stance at the Second UN Conference on Space"]

[Text] The number of countries working on national programs for the study and use of outer space or participating in joint programs is growing. The leaders in space exploration are the USSR and the United States, and the level of international space cooperation depends largely on the policy pursued by these two states. The results of 25 years of activity by states in the exploration of space and the practical use of the achievements of astronautics, the present state of cooperation in the use of space and the prospects for this cooperation were discussed at the second UN conference on the study and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, which was held in Vienna from 9 through 21 August 1982 and was attended by representatives from 94 states and several international organizations.

The participants were understandably quite interested in the views of the leading space powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, on the topics discussed and noted the significant differences between the Soviet and U.S. approaches to questions connected with future international cooperation in the study and use of space.

The views of the Soviet delegation were based on the well-known premises of the Program of Struggle for Peace, put forth by the CPSU at its 24th Congress in 1971 and then reaffirmed and amplified at the 25th and 26th congresses. As Vice President V. A. Kotelnikov of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the head of the Soviet delegation, stressed in his speech at the conference, the Soviet Union approves and supports the goals of international cooperation in the study and use of space, regards participation in this cooperation as one of the most important aspects of its activity and wants this cooperation to be meaningful, democratic, mutually beneficial and productive. This approach is consistent with the interests of all countries.

At the 36th session of the UN General Assembly in 1981, the Soviet Union proposed the conclusion of an international treaty to ban the placement of weapons of any type in outer space. The drafting and adoption of this kind

of treaty would prevent the militarization of outer space and would permanently keep space free and clear of all types of weapons and keep it from becoming an arena of the arms race and a source of friction between states.

The UN General Assembly acknowledged the danger mankind would have to face if outer space should become an arena of the arms race and requested the Disarmament Commission to begin negotiating an agreement on the text of a treaty banning the emplacement of weapons of all types in outer space. As a result of the negative response of U.S. representatives on the committee, however, the Soviet draft treaty has still not been discussed in earnest. The U.S. responded in this way to the Soviet proposal because the American Administration wants to use space for military purposes. On 4 July 1982 President Reagan's directive on national space policy over the next decade was published. Dividing American space activity into two basic areas--a program of civilian research and a national security program--the White House unequivocally assigned priority to the program for the military use of space and acknowledged that it could become a potential theater of combat. This is apparent from the interpretation of the very phrase "safeguarding national security" in this directive. To justify this obviously aggressive policy, Washington, as always, is employing the notorious concept of the military threat the United States is supposedly facing.

As for the directive's statement about the use of space equipment in "crisis and conflict" situations, the United States has already begun work on this part of the program. The American mass media reported the transmission of data to England from American satellites at the time of the Anglo-Argentine armed conflict in the region of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. During the general discussion at the second UN space conference, several delegations were concerned about the possible use of reconnaissance satellites to aid Israel in its aggression against Lebanon.

The U.S. civilian space program is also geared considerably to the interests of military agencies. "Strengthening U.S. security" is prominent among the main objectives of U.S. space policy in this program as well. Although the authors of the directive speak of adherence to the principle of space exploration for peaceful purposes, they stipulate that "peaceful purposes include actions aimed at attaining the goals of national security."

At the end of 1982 the United States began using the shuttle system, after the testing of this system was considered to be complete. According to the directive, the shuttle system will be the main means of carrying payloads into space, with priority assigned to "flights connected with national security."

A special intergovernmental group was formed to coordinate U.S. national space policy. It is headed by the President's national security adviser and its members include the deputy secretaries of defense, state and commerce, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the director of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The composition of this group, in which military representatives are in the majority, speaks for itself.

The content of Ronald Reagan's directive obviously conflicts with U.S. obligations stemming from the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1967), which has been signed by 82 states, including the United States. Whereas the treaty declares that outer space is "free for scientific research" (Art I), the directive assigns priority to "maintaining the freedom of space for activities promoting stronger security." The treaty envisages the development of broad-scale international cooperation in the exploration and use of space "for peaceful purposes" (in the fourth paragraph of the preamble), but the directive interprets this cooperation to include activities connected with the military use of space, camouflaging this as well with the term "national security."

Against the background of the vigorous U.S. steps to militarize space, the statement in the directive about the intention to secure "U.S. leadership in space" cannot be interpreted as anything other than an objective consistent with the attempts to achieve military-strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. Despite the principle of cooperation lying at the basis of the 1967 treaty on outer space, there are obvious plans for rivalry in this sphere. The reluctance of the American side to renew the Soviet-American agreement on cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, which was first concluded for the period from 1972 to 1977 and was then renewed and was in effect until May 1982, should obviously be regarded as a refusal to cooperate.

Most of the delegations at the second UN space conference wanted its final report to express grave concern over the mounting danger of the militarization of outer space. When the head of the American delegation, NASA Director J. Beggs, addressed the plenum, he simply ignored this problem. It was not until the very end of the conference, when it became obvious that the United States might run the risk of remaining in an isolated position on this important issue, that the U.S. delegation reluctantly agreed that the report should express concern over the possible spread of the arms race to outer space.

The American mass media tried to depict conference statements based on the common views of representatives from the socialist and developing states and some West European countries as a "propaganda victory" for the Soviet Union. But the matter in question is of vital importance--the preservation of peace on earth, and not tactical diplomatic moves. The Soviet draft treaty banning the emplacement of weapons in outer space would serve as an excellent basis for the prevention of the militarization of space. As we know, the draft was supported by the overwhelming majority of states at the 36th and 37th sessions of the UN General Assembly.

Representatives from the United States and its closest allies have taken an unconstructive stance in the Disarmament Commission and have impeded the creation of a special task force to draft the appropriate international treaty. Furthermore, they maintain that a ban on antisatellite systems is the primary objective.

The Soviet Union believes that its draft treaty covers the problem of anti-satellite systems, which should be examined within the context of broader measures to prohibit the emplacement of weapons in space. In addition, the USSR is willing to resume the bilateral Soviet-American talks on anti-satellite systems, and this was announced by the Soviet representative on the First Committee at the 37th session of the UN General Assembly.

Questions connected with international cooperation in space exploration were the central topic of discussion at the conference. Even when preparations were being made for the conference, the national reports submitted by states spoke of the need to broaden and improve international cooperation, including projects overseen by the United Nations and its specialized establishments.

One example of productive multilateral cooperation is the Interkosmos joint research program that is being carried out by Bulgaria, Hungary, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the GDR, Cuba, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the USSR and Czechoslovakia. Emissaries from all of these countries made space flights on Soviet space ships and stations during the 1978-1981 period within the framework of this program. One of the program's characteristic features is its insistence on the use of space achievements in practical ways for the national economic needs of each participant. Another important feature of the program is the offer of Soviet space equipment by the USSR for joint projects. This was discussed in detail at the conference by representatives from the socialist countries.

The directive on U.S. national space policy reflects the Washington Administration's selfish approach to international cooperation. The promotion of international cooperation in the "national interest" of the United States is declared as one of the goals of American space policy. This statement is then clarified: "The United States will conduct space-related international activity on a cooperative basis if it can be of scientific, political and economic benefit to the nation and safeguard national security.... The United States will continue to cooperate with other countries in international space activity, working on joint scientific and research programs which are consistent with technology transmission regulations and which will indisputably benefit to the United States."

When we compare these statements with the provisions of the 1967 treaty on outer space, we can see that the necessary agreement is lacking. Article I of the treaty stipulates that "the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, will be conducted for the good of all countries and in the interest of all countries, regardless of their levels of economic or scientific development," and Article IX says that "states party to the treaty should be guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance" in the exploration and use of space and must conduct all of their own activities in outer space "with the necessary consideration for the interests of all other states party to the treaty." The directive, on the other hand, repeatedly stresses the intention to secure U.S. leadership in space--first as a general goal and then in relation to space transport systems based on the space shuttle. It is obvious that this is not being done for the sake of scientific and technical progress in general.

In the United States, scientific and technical achievements are actively used for foreign policy purposes. At the end of World War II, American politicians already foresaw the need for the systematic inclusion of "scientific policy" in postwar diplomacy in relations with other states and in the newly formed United Nations.

One aspect of U.S. space policy concerns the foreign merchandising of space technology and the results of its use in order to improve the balance of foreign trade. In its attempts to profit from the space business, the United States takes actions in the international arena which go against the legitimate demands of other states for respect for their sovereign rights. At the second conference on outer space, many delegations pointed out the danger of the use of data acquired by satellites for military purposes or for interference in the exercise of various countries' rights with regard to their territory and natural resources. The developing countries proposed that the conference report mention the need for the rapid completion of the work being conducted by the UN Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space to draft the principles governing long-distance global observations in order to exclude the possibility of the transmission to third countries of data obtained by one state and pertaining to the territory of another state without the latter's consent.

The U.S. delegation did not support this proposal because it wants to secure a "free market" for the data obtained with the aid of the LANDSAT system. Besides this, the U.S. representatives did not agree that the direct satellite transmission of television programs should be organized for a foreign state only after it has clearly consented to this.* These examples testify to the expansionist nature of U.S. policy on the practical use of space technology.

Striving to somehow "ennoble" its unpopular stand on the problems, the U.S. delegation reaffirmed its intention to take several steps toward the practical use of space technology in conjunction with other interested governments and establishments and expressed the hope that these steps might seem particularly appealing to the developing countries. The actual purpose of these proposals becomes more evident if they are examined through the prism of the above-mentioned objective of deriving economic benefits from space-related international cooperation.

One of these steps is to be a seminar on communication satellites, to be held in 1983 in the United States, for the discussion of the main aspects of the construction and design of electronic space communications systems. Participants in the seminar will have an opportunity to visit enterprises for the manufacture of communications satellites and organizations in charge of space communications. It is obvious that this undertaking is supposed to promote the commercial use of the services offered by the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), operating on the basis of

* The principles governing direct satellite television broadcasting were adopted by an overwhelming majority of votes at the 37th session of the UN General Assembly. The U.S. delegation and a few of its allies voted against these principles.

American equipment and under the supervision of the COMSAT corporation. This could give American industry access to new sales markets for INTELSAT equipment.

When the United States suggested that the creation of an international system of mobile communications to render assistance in natural disasters be considered, it proposed that it be financed jointly and that its technical base consist of the INTELSAT system and its national MARISAT maritime communications system. In other words, it was essentially proposing the sale of the services of American communication organizations for the purpose of raising their profit margin. The United States hopes to advertise its technical equipment at a conference it plans to hold in Washington in 1984 to discuss the use of space monitoring and early warning technology in natural disasters.

Many countries are interested in the practical applications of space equipment. The possible consequences of its use, however, call for the international legal regulation of a number of questions. The United States has no interest in this regulation, preferring the purely commercial approach to the legal one.

In recent years, the broader involvement of private capital in space-related activity has been suggested with increasing frequency by U.S. representatives in various international forums.

The need to transfer to the commercial use of space is used as justification for the broader involvement of the private sector in the work on the space program. The chairman of the House Committee on Science and Technology of the American Congress believes that success in the industrialization of outer space (that is, the development of production on board space stations) will depend on private enterprise.

The basic objectives of the directive on U.S. national space policy of 4 July 1982 include broader capital investments and participation by the "private sector" in space research and related civilian projects, which, as has already been pointed out, are largely subordinate to military goals.

It is obvious that the tendency toward the more active use of private capital in the space business reflects the worries of the administrators of the U.S. civilian space program about cuts in government allocations for this program and their redistribution among military programs. The NASA budget has decreased constantly since 1966, but Defense Department expenditures on space programs have grown continuously, particularly since 1973. This department's expenditures on the space program in 1982 were estimated to be at least 8.4 billion dollars, which is 1.5 times the amount spent on the civilian program.

Conference participants had a negative response to the idea of the commercialization of space. Statements by several delegations expressed the opinion that real cooperation must not be confused with trade in space technology, and this was reflected in the final report. This is understandable if we

consider that the majority of delegations believe that levels of space technology in the developed and developing countries should be equalized and scientific and technical potentials should be distributed more equitably. If space technology should end up in the hands of private business, its representatives will quite understandably have no incentive to promote its further development in all countries and will not work toward this goal. Scientific and technical cooperation between states in this area will begin to disappear and be replaced by the purchase and sale of finished products. This will not reduce the technological gap, but will widen it and will lead to "scientific colonialism," as the representative from Indonesia called it.

The final report noted that international cooperation in the area of space science and technology should help the developing countries strengthen their creative potential and promote their independent scientific and technical development. The report said nothing about trade in space technology or the involvement of private capital in this area. On the contrary, it said that all opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation between various countries must be utilized to the utmost.

A positive example of international cooperation in the development of space technology was mentioned in the report--the work carried out by the socialist countries within the framework of the Interkosmos program. In accordance with this program, which includes such fields as physics, astronomy, medicine and others, the countries of the socialist community have been working jointly for many years on the development of scientific instruments and operational systems and on joint research and experimental design projects.

It must be said that the conference debates and final report reflect the growing interest of the people of the world in the joint exploration of space and the use of the achievements of astronautics for peaceful purposes. The conference essentially confirmed the global nature of space exploration in the interest of all mankind. The attempts of the U.S. delegation to address the world as the leader in space exploration and to gain privileges in this area were unsuccessful. At the same time, the international forum revealed fundamental differences in the moral and political approaches of the Soviet Union and the United States to international space-related cooperation. The overwhelming majority of delegations favored the further reinforcement of the lawful use of space in line with the democratic principles of international relations.

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DECEMBER 1982 REAGAN TOUR, U.S. CENTRAL AMERICA GOALS VIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 83
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[Article by I. I. Lyudogovskaya: "Washington's Latest 'Cosmetic Operation'"]

[Text] One of the distinctive features of the Reagan Administration's foreign policy line is the considerably heightened interest in the Latin American countries. The American President himself, the secretary of state and other government officials have invariably stressed that the White House has "the deepest respect" for its southern neighbors and is "fully determined" to demonstrate its concern for them. "I have always believed that one of the most important primary goals of our administration," Ronald Reagan said in December 1982, "should be the improvement of relations with our neighbors in this hemisphere, which is of extremely great significance to us."

As a rule, U.S. statements about "greater concern" for the Latin Americans and the desire to improve relations with them are made by White House officials when events in this region pose a threat, in Washington's opinion, to U.S. interests or when interrelations with these countries deteriorate abruptly as a result of Washington's behavior and energetic measures must be taken to correct the situation; or, and this is most frequently the case, when these factors are operating simultaneously.

In our day, Washington is increasingly likely to encounter the refusal of some Latin American countries to give in to its demands, their determination to conduct an independent foreign and domestic policy and their protests and struggle against the tyranny of repressive dictatorships imposed upon them by Washington. These tendencies in the states south of the Rio Grande irritate U.S. ruling circles. They are disregarding present realities, particularly the growing scales and prestige of the movement for nonalignment, and are still trying to conduct a policy of force and intimidate people with the myth of the "Soviet threat."

The Latin American countries are not only displaying increasing displeasure with Washington's authoritarian behavior; they are becoming convinced of the United States' unreliability as a political and military ally in the OAS and the inter-American treaty "of reciprocal assistance." A vivid example of this was provided by the Falkland (Malvinas) crisis of summer 1982, when the

United States took the side of its imperialist NATO ally, Great Britain. The Latin American countries are also seriously dissatisfied with their economic relations with the United States and with Washington's attempts to solve its own economic problems at their expense.

The prestige of the United States has been undermined considerably in the region. Furthermore, a crisis in the entire system of inter-American relations is being discussed with increasing frequency in Latin America and even in the United States.

In an attempt to correct the situation, President Reagan spent the period between 29 November and 4 December 1982 touring Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica and Honduras and negotiating with R. Montt, the head of the Guatemalan military junta, and A. Magaña, provisional president of El Salvador.

Commenting on Ronald Reagan's visit, political observers said that he was striving mainly to restore faith in the North American model of so-called "democracy and democratic institutions," win support for his policy in Central America and the Caribbean, save the disintegrating inter-American system and strengthening U.S. economic positions.

From the very beginning, the new Republican Administration resolved to strengthen the pro-American dictatorships in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, to intimidate the governments of Cuba, Nicaragua and Guyana and to augment the American military presence in the region. Officials, including the President, stressed repeatedly that the United States would stop at nothing to "stabilize" the situation in the region and might resort to overt armed intervention. The administration was obviously striving to demonstrate its willingness to take decisive action in defense of "American interests" in Central America and simultaneously to denigrate the policy of the USSR and Cuba.

The increasingly loud criticism inside and outside the United States with regard to American intervention in El Salvador and other countries of the region, however, forced the administration to change its tactics. Fewer belligerent statements were made by the President and by other members of the administration (this became noticeable when G. Shultz took office as secretary of state). To provide its aggressive line with an ideological screen, the United States hypocritically announced the start of a campaign in support of "broader democracy" in the region.

In October 1982 the United States organized a conference in San Jose, the capital of Costa Rica, for the discussion of "ways of establishing peace and stability in Central America" by several Latin American countries (including Costa Rica, Belize, El Salvador and Colombia). When the conference was over, the creation of an organization to give technical support and assistance to countries wishing to hold "democratic elections" ("democratic" in the American sense of the term) was announced.

In this way, the White House took another step in carrying out its so-called "election strategy," which was announced in 1981. At that time, "elections" were held under pressure from Washington in Honduras, and "democratic

elections" were then held in Guatemala and later in El Salvador in 1982. The results of the "elections" in El Salvador quite clearly demonstrated the essence of this strategy: The supporters of Major d'Aubisson, known for his extreme rightwing, near-fascist views, won a majority in the constitutional assembly, the highest legislative body in the country. This government escalated the wave of terror in El Salvador when it took charge. Assured of the Reagan Administration's total support, it acted so blatantly that Washington has had to make "critical remarks" from time to time in order to avoid accusations of total complicity with the anti-people regime in this country. For example, D. Hinton, the U.S. ambassador in El Salvador, "warned" the Salvadoran authorities that they might lose 360 million dollars in U.S. military and economic aid if the state of affairs in the area of "human rights" were not improved (30,000 civilians were killed in El Salvador within 3 years) and if the persons responsible for the murder of four American nuns and two specialists in 1981 were not prosecuted.

In response to the American ambassador's statement, extreme rightwing elements in the Salvadoran leadership advised Magaña, the provisional president of the country, to "never kneel" to beg for American aid and accused D. Hinton of interfering in the country's internal affairs. The "threat" worked. When the American President met with Magaña during his tour of Latin America, he assured him that the United States would give El Salvador more "aid."

A similar promise was made to the rulers of Honduras, who have been generously financed by the United States in appreciation for their active support of Washington in its actions against Nicaragua (the Honduran military junta has received around 200 million dollars from the United States in the last 2 years).

Alleging that the terrorist regime in Guatemala had made "serious progress in the observance of human rights," Washington resumed giving it American military aid (which, it later turned out, had never even been cut off).

In an attempt to form a ring of hostile states around Nicaragua, Washington is trying to involve neighboring Costa Rica in its plans to smother the Sandinist Government. This was the main purpose of Ronald Reagan's talks with President L. A. Monge. Washington is striving to include Costa Rica in the anti-Nicaraguan coalition by intimidating it with the Nicaraguan military threat and by promising it 276 million dollars in American economic aid in fiscal year 1983. As for aid in the form of weapons, the United States is using its loyal ally, Israel, for this purpose. It was no coincidence that Israeli Minister Y. Shamir arrived in Costa Rica a few days after Reagan had left and promised "security assistance" (earlier, when the president of Costa Rica was in Washington, Prime Minister Begin of Israel met with him there and expressed his willingness to "aid Costa Rican security forces if they should enter into battle against the Sandinists").

But the president of Costa Rica did not allow himself to become involved in Washington's plans. He rejected the U.S. President's proposal that a "mini-meeting" of Latin American heads of government be held in San Jose without the participation of Nicaragua and expressed his government's concern about

the exacerbation of the situation in Central America. Furthermore, Costa Rica and Nicaragua issued a joint statement about their decision to cooperate in defending the borders owned between the two countries against infiltration by Somozist gangs.

The Nicaraguan Government called Ronald Reagan's meetings with the heads of the Guatemalan, Honduran and Salvadoran governments "provocative actions against our country, calculated to coordinate the actions of the hostile neighbors surrounding it."

The hope of winning support for the U.S. adventurist policy line in Central America and the Caribbean basin was also one of the reasons for Reagan's trip to another Latin American country--Brazil. The White House had made earlier attempts to involve Brazil in U.S. policy in the region, but they were also unsuccessful. This time the American President was informed that Brazil would remain neutral on events in Central America. "We are firmly convinced," Brazilian President J. Figueiredo said, "that in this region... the rights of peoples and the sovereignty of governments should be respected without any kind of outside pressure."

Washington's hope of winning support for its policy in Central America from the Colombian Government was even more unfounded. The recently elected president of the country, progressive politician B. Betancur, told his visitors that existing reality on the continent would necessitate changes in Washington's policy line in Latin America.

The second goal of Reagan's trip was the improvement of the state of affairs in U.S. trade and economic relations with the Latin American countries.

Economic problems were discussed primarily during the American President's meetings with Brazilian President J. Figueiredo. Brazil, the largest Latin American country, is now encountering serious economic difficulties as a result of the high interest rates in American banks, the dropping prices of such traditional Brazilian exports as coffee, cocoa and sugar, and the crisis-related phenomena common to the economies of all developed capitalist countries. Besides this, Brazil has a sizable foreign debt: According to its central bank, the country's foreign debt is approaching 85 billion dollars, while its currency reserves, which totaled 7.5 billion dollars at the beginning of 1982, had decreased to 3 billion by the end of the year.

Under these conditions, the Brazilian Government is trying to increase its exports (export revenues represent an important part of its income) but is encountering rigid protectionist measures in the United States (in particular, the duties on imported Brazilian goods have been raised considerably) and is suffering losses totaling billions of dollars.

This discriminatory U.S. policy has seriously disturbed Brazilian ruling circles. President Figueiredo spoke of this during his talks with the U.S. President. Reagan responded by offering Brazil a loan of 1.2 billion dollars and promising to "convince" the IMF to grant Brazil's request for up to 6 billion dollars in credit to cover its current loan payments. But this

"good deed" was engineered by American banks, Brazil's main creditors, which, as the WASHINGTON POST remarked, "will go up in smoke if their debtors cannot pay their debts." Besides this, when Brazil requests loans from the IMF, it must pledge to conduct a restrictive domestic economic policy--minimizing economic growth and giving less support to underprivileged population strata. The Brazilian newspaper JORNAL DO BRASIL noted that the Brazilian public and business community were discouraged and upset by the American delegation's negotiating style. "It was like the Texas method," it remarked, "in which one of the parties ostentatiously lays his money on the table before he starts talking."

The economic problems of inter-American relations were also discussed in Bogota, the capital of Colombia. The Colombian side also expressed its displeasure with the current state of trade and economic relations between the two countries. Referring to the intensification of U.S. protectionism, Colombian Minister of Economic Development R. Echavarria said at a press conference on 1 December 1982 that "it is becoming increasingly difficult to sell in the United States." He particularly stressed the fact that the United States had imposed restrictions on purchases of Colombian flowers, an important export. As a result, tens of thousands of Colombians who make their living growing and exporting flowers, are on the verge of ruin. Reagan responded by advising the rapid conclusion of an agreement on a significant rise in loan quotas in the International Monetary Fund and the Inter-American Development Bank.

During his visit to Costa Rica and Honduras, Reagan took every opportunity to publicize the United States' so-called "Caribbean initiative," a program announced in February 1982. It included a promise to give 350 million dollars in aid to the Central American and Caribbean countries, to encourage the investment of American private capital in these countries and to exempt their exports from U.S. duties for 12 years.

While he was publicizing the "Caribbean initiative," Ronald Reagan tried to portray it as a benevolent gesture on the part of the United States, and not as a measure it was forced to take when its attempts to fuel hysteria in Central America had failed and the White House had finally had to admit that the state of crisis in the subregion was not the result of activities by the USSR, Cuba, Nicaragua or Guyana, but of the horrifying poverty in which most of the people in these countries live.

After the events of summer 1982 in the South Atlantic over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, it was more difficult for Washington to assure its southern neighbors of its adherence to "inter-American solidarity," although Reagan took his trip just after the U.S. delegation at the 37th session of the UN General Assembly had voted in favor of the draft resolution submitted by the Latin American countries, calling upon Great Britain and Argentina to negotiate the sovereignty of the islands. Nevertheless, this subject was a constant theme of President Reagan's statements during his December tour of Latin America.

But the Latin Americans are now less inclined to believe Washington. The deep-seated conflicts between the United States and its southern neighbors are growing more acute, and even extreme measures like the appearance of the U.S. President in person are no longer having the impact Washington could count on for decades. Commenting on the results of the American President's tour of the Latin American countries, the WASHINGTON POST called it "a cosmetic operation at best." In this way, it reaffirmed something that has become a virtual axiom: Washington "starts paying attention" to the countries south of the Rio Grande and takes hasty measures only when it is displeased with events in these countries. But these measures do not change the essence of U.S. Latin American policy. It is the same old policy of neocolonialism and hegemonism; what is more, these features have become even more pronounced under the current administration.

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U.S. UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, REAGAN ADMINISTRATION POLICY SCORED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 83
(signed to press 14 Feb 83) pp 74-78

[Article by V. B. Supyan: "Record Unemployment"]

[Text] The scales of unemployment in the United States have reached record proportions unprecedented since the time of the "great depression" of the 1930's. By 1 January 1983, over 10.8 percent of the entire labor force, according to official statistics, was unemployed. In other words, 12 million people were totally unemployed. Besides this, there are 6.6 million Americans who are partially unemployed* and 1.6 million who have lost all hope of finding a job and have therefore stopped looking for one. This means that the actual number of unemployed individuals have risen to a minimum of 20 million by the end of 1982 and the beginning of 1983.

The qualitative characteristics of unemployment have also deteriorated sharply. For example, at the end of 1982 the average duration of unemployment was 15 weeks, which was much higher than the indicators for crisis years in the past decade. Furthermore, the percentage of people who remained unemployed for 15 weeks or more rose considerably--31.2 percent of all unemployed people. The proportion accounted for by laid-off workers in the total number of unemployed individuals rose to 58 percent during the second quarter of 1982, as compared to 55.4 percent in 1975--a time of economic crisis and impending depression.

The considerable growth of the overall scales of unemployment is connected with more than just the present economic crisis, which has now been going on for more than 3 years. The main reasons for the rise in the U.S. rate of unemployment in the 1980's are connected with long-term processes, especially the capitalist methods of augmenting production efficiency under the conditions of the technological revolution. When capitalist methods of economic management are employed, the negative effects of the technological revolution on the labor market are reflected, in particular, in the fact that the post-crisis renewal of fixed capital is accompanied by substantial changes in the very patterns of investment. For example, a higher percentage of capital is

* Partially unemployed people are those who work only a part-time week for economic reasons--that is, because they cannot find a full-time job.

invested in the modernization of production and the remodeling of enterprises, and less capital is invested in new construction. All of this eventually results in a relative, and often an absolute, drop in the demand for manpower even during periods of cyclical recovery and growth and slows down the reduction of unemployment.

This tendency has become more pronounced in the 1980's, now that the modernization of production in the United States is more likely to be accomplished on a qualitatively new basis, especially with the use of microprocessors. The broad-scale incorporation of microprocessors in production and the creation of automatic systems based on them are augmenting labor productivity and reducing the demand for manpower. Ample proof of this can be found in statistics pertaining to the automotive industry, where robots controlled by microprocessors are being used more widely than in other American industries. For example, each of the 128 robot-welders operating at Chrysler plants in Detroit and Delaware replaced 3 or 4 workers. Another corporation, General Motors, plans to buy 14,000 industrial robots in the next 10 years, which will, according to a specialist from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, will result in the dismissal of 40,000-50,000 people, or approximately the same number now employed by the entire Chrysler Corporation. According to the forecasts of FORTUNE magazine, the continued introduction of robots will cut the labor force in the automotive industry in half by the year 2000.

It is also significant that the tendency toward a relative and/or absolute drop in the demand for manpower under the influence of scientific and technical progress have been evident primarily in the sphere of physical production, particularly in the processing industry, where there was virtually no increase in employment throughout the 1970's and the early 1980's. In the 1980's, however, these processes will spread to the service sphere, where labor-saving equipment is being incorporated in many branches. This will heighten the impact of scientific and technical progress and cyclical fluctuations on employment in the service sphere and will increase its instability. For example, whereas the number of people employed in this sphere increased by 796,000 during the economic crisis of 1969-1970, when the production slump lasted 12 months, the figure was only 295,000 during a period of equal length in the present crisis, from July 1981 through June 1982. Consequently, the service sphere, which previously absorbed much of the displaced manpower from the sphere of physical production, is now performing this function on a much smaller scale. This is also causing the deterioration of conditions in the labor market.

Along with the technological revolution, changes in the structure of the labor supply are having a substantial impact on the labor market. In particular, there is the influence of the postwar baby boom, which has raised the number of young workers in the labor market considerably ever since the middle of the 1960's. For example, young people between the ages of 16 and 24 accounted for 15 percent of the labor force in 1955, but the figure was 23.5 percent in 1980. The percentage of women in the labor force has also risen considerably, and this has been due to deep-seated social factors (the rising educational level of this part of the population, the increased

contribution of women to the family income, etc.). During that same period the proportion accounted for by women in the labor force rose from 31.5 percent to 42.6 percent. The higher demand for jobs in these segments of the labor force, particularly those that are most likely to be unemployed, played a significant role in raising the overall unemployment rate.

The increase in the number of young workers in the labor market has slowed down somewhat recently in connection with changes in the demographic situation, particularly the drop in the birth rate after the 1960's and the slower growth of the population and, consequently, of the labor force. As for women, the percentage of them in the labor force is still increasing: It was 43.6 percent in the middle of 1982. Forecasts predict a further increase.

Obviously, the crux of the matter does not lie in the growing number of young people and women entering the labor force, which bourgeois economists try to use as an explanation for the rise in unemployment by portraying it as a purely demographic factor, but in the capitalist economy's inability to use labor resources efficiently and in the inadequacy of manpower training systems, especially in the case of young workers, from the standpoint of production requirements.

One of the major destabilizing factors in today's labor market is the social policy of the Reagan Administration. Since the beginning of the 1980's the economic policy of the U.S. Administration has been influenced primarily by the eclectic theory of "supply-side economics," which relies heavily on market forces and on the limitation of government intervention in economic activities. When the Republican Administration took charge in 1981, it began to cut federal labor programs considerably in line with the requirements of "Reaganomics," which presuppose a substantial reduction in government expenditures in the socioeconomic sphere and emphasize the interests of big capital at the working population's expense.

Despite the significant rise in the unemployment rate since the start of the Reagan Administration (from 7.4 percent in January 1981 to 10.8 percent in January 1983), some manpower training and employment programs have either been cut or have ceased to exist. For example, the canceled programs include one for the creation of public service jobs (a total of 3.7 billion dollars). This has stimulated the growth of unemployment. The summer job program for youth has been cut. In 1983 allocations for occupational training and unemployment compensation will be cut by 1.9 billion dollars. The law passed in 1973 on employment and labor training will expire the same year and will not be renewed. In place of the broad-scale job programs instituted in the 1970's in accordance with this law, a few much more modest vocational training programs for specific groups (people laid off for various reasons, disabled workers, etc.) will be instituted for a total of only 2.4 billion dollars. In other words, the most important aspect of governmental regulation in the employment sphere--the creation of jobs in the state sector--will be virtually curtailed in the 1980's.

Other programs for state manpower regulation have also undergone substantial cuts. For example, the Reagan Administration set more rigid conditions for the receipt of unemployment compensation. At the end of 1982 this kind of

compensation was being collected only by around 40 percent of all the unemployed, but the figure in 1975 was 75 percent. Furthermore, the term of the compensation was reduced to 26 weeks in the majority of states, and the amount of compensation, which differs widely from one state to another, is far below the minimum subsistence level. All of this is making the situation in the labor market even worse.

There was also a change for the worse in the indicators of the very structure of unemployment--that is, its professional, sectorial and demographic composition. For example, at the beginning of the 1980's the percentage of physical laborers, especially industrial workers, among the unemployed was slightly higher than it had been at the end of the 1970's (from 57.6 percent in 1979 to 59.5 percent in 1982). This was a deviation from the general long-range tendency toward a rise in the percentage of unemployed workers engaged primarily in non-physical labor, which has been apparent for almost the entire postwar period. This "exception to the rule" is connected with the severe economic crisis of the early 1980's, because the percentage of laborers among the unemployed generally rises during periods of crisis. As for the various occupational groups of manpower, the rate of unemployment has risen in virtually all of them, but the highest rise has affected semiskilled and unskilled workers (from 8-11 percent in 1979 to more than 16 percent in 1982). The rate of unemployment is also higher now among previously privileged categories of manpower--scientists, engineers and other specialists with a higher and secondary specialized education: It exceeded 5 percent in 1982. Here the rise in unemployment is also due to more than just the economic crisis: It stems from long-term factors, namely the spread of capitalist labor efficiency methods to these professions and their transformation into mass occupations.

The distribution of unemployment among sectors and branches of the economy has been quite uneven. Although the percentage of service workers among the unemployed rose over the long range, at the beginning of the 1980's it decreased slightly--from 52.2 percent in 1979 to 48.7 percent in 1982. This occurred because industry is the prime source of unemployment during periods of crisis. In 1982 the rate of unemployment hit record levels in several branches: It exceeded 20 percent in the automobile industry, it was over 40 percent in the metallurgical industry and it was 12 percent in the processing sector as a whole. It appears, however, that these high indicators of unemployment in these branches are not only a symptom of economic crisis; they reflect structural changes in the American economy--the protracted (non-cyclical) crisis in old branches of industry and the beginning of their radical retooling.

One of the distinctive features of the labor reserve at the beginning of the 1980's was the extremely high rate of unemployment among youth: At the end of 1982, 19 percent of all young adults up to the age of 20 and 16 percent between the ages of 20 and 24 were unemployed. This was primarily due to the economic crisis, which has had an extremely negative effect on job opportunities for youth. At the same time, the proportion accounted for by young adults (16-24 years of age) among the unemployed decreased slightly (from almost 49 percent in 1979 to 45 percent in 1982), which was a result of

the previously mentioned drop in the percentage accounted for by this age group in the labor force.

Conditions for women in the labor market are still extremely unfavorable. In September 1982 the rate of unemployment among women was 9.8 percent (no later data are available as yet). At the same time, an important feature of the present demographic composition of unemployed labor is the high--and extraordinarily high for the postwar period--rate of unemployment among men--the heads of families and often the only breadwinners. The rate of unemployment among men in the main working-age group (25-54) rose from 3.4 percent in 1979 to 7.6 percent in 1982.

At the beginning of the 1980's the status of racial and ethnic minorities in the employment sphere dropped perceptibly. The rate of unemployment in this labor category was 19 percent at the end of 1982, and the proportion accounted for by minorities in the total number of unemployed Americans was almost 24 percent. Conditions in the labor market are absolutely catastrophic for young blacks and members of other non-white population groups; unemployment here has risen to almost 60 percent. One of the main reasons for this is racial discrimination, and even bourgeois officials have had to acknowledge this fact. For example, when director V. Jordan of the National Urban League was discussing unemployment among racial and ethnic minorities, he said quite frankly that racial discrimination is its "main element."

Even the unemployment forecasts of American economists are quite depressing. According to their calculations, 1.8 million jobs will have to be created in the nation annually just to absorb the natural increase in the labor force. Besides this, it will take the creation of another 1.1 million jobs to lower the rate of unemployment by just 1 percent. The increase in the number of workers under the conditions of the economic difficulties of the 1980's is becoming a pressing problem. According to FORTUNE (10 January 1983) magazine's estimates, the rate of unemployment will rise again this year--to 11 percent--and will drop by no more than 1 percent--or to 10 percent--in 1984. Other forecasts also indicate hard times ahead.

The employment situation in other capitalist countries has deteriorated along with the situation in the U.S. labor market. In Western Europe, for example, the rate of unemployment was 8.6 percent by the beginning of 1982, and it was measured in double-digit figures in some countries: 16 percent in Belgium, 15.3 percent in Ireland and Spain, 11.8 percent in England and 11.2 percent in Holland.

Unemployment causes laborers to suffer material losses and social and moral injuries. The loss of a job is a personal tragedy in the capitalist society. It severs an entire network of contacts. The American press has reported that many unemployed individuals are now literally paralyzed by the hopelessness of the situation and are in a state of deep depression. The 18 October 1982 issue of NEWSWEEK, for example, quoted a remark by a laid-off steelworker, Wesley Jones, from Detroit: "I had big plans, but now they are gone. I feel as if I have been thrown into a hole and there is no way out."

The constant feelings of inferiority connected with the loss of social prestige, the hopelessness and the despair which seize the individual often have tragic implications. For example, according to the data of a Senate subcommittee on health, a rise of 1 percent in the national rate of unemployment (for example, from 9 to 10 percent) stimulates 40,000 deaths due to heart attacks, mental disorders and suicides. "Unemployment inflicts irreparable damage," S. Taylor, Michigan state official, said. "It raises the rates of crime, divorce, alcoholism and many other social problems."

The tendencies listed above are the reasons for the new and much larger parameters of the entire unemployment problem and of its even more important place and significance in the capitalist countries. It is completely obvious that the current state of mass unemployment is not only an urgent socioeconomic problem but also an important political problem. In the United States, for example, it played a significant role in the loss of many votes by Republican candidates in the 1982 elections. There is also no question that the situation in the labor market will largely set the tone of the political struggle in the 1984 presidential election.

Therefore, as one of the main symptoms of the contradictions between labor and capital, unemployment represents the accumulation of an entire group of socioeconomic and sociopolitical problems of state-monopoly capitalism and is intensifying its general crisis.

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97TH CONGRESS DEBATES ON MX, ARMS CONTROL, PIPELINE DESCRIBED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 83
(signed to press 14 Feb 83) pp 79-84

[Article by N. B. Tatarinova and V. L. Chernov: "The 97th Congress and Soviet-American Relations"]

[Text] Congress is often called a mirror of U.S. politics, reflecting the alignment of forces in the ruling circles of this nation with regard to a broad range of domestic and foreign policy issues, including problems in American-Soviet relations. The "mirror" of the 97th Congress clearly reflected the sustained level of energetic activity by conservative, reactionary groups opposing constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union and favoring action from a position of strength. The opponents of the normalization of American-Soviet relations made several attempts to complicate these relations even more (for example, in June 1982 a group of Republicans in the House of Representatives proposed the further curtailment of Soviet-U.S. business relations, the prohibition of the crediting of American-Soviet trade transactions by the federal government and the cessation of all commercial cooperation with the Soviet Union).¹ In essence, the 97th Congress did not adopt a single resolution aimed at the improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations or the normalization of international affairs in general.

In line with the aggressive foreign policy aims of the Reagan Administration, the congressional groups supporting it made a considerable effort to exacerbate the already tense international situation. In particular, with their assistance the White House was able to push the biggest military budget in U.S. history through the nation's highest legislative body. This is the military budget for fiscal year 1983, in the amount of 232 billion dollars,² which gave the Pentagon the means to create and deploy new weapons of mass destruction. Under pressure from the administration, the Senate rejected the resolution of E. Kennedy (Democrat, Massachusetts) and M. Hatfield (Republican, Oregon) on nuclear arms reduction and a nuclear freeze and essentially supported the administration's unconstructive stance at the Soviet-American talks in Geneva on strategic arms limitation and reduction (START).

With the approval of the Congress, the Reagan Administration gained an opportunity to continue escalating the arms race and build up U.S. military presence in various parts of the world in order to stifle national liberation movements and undermine the positions of socialism in Asia, Africa and Latin

America: According to a bill approved by members of both congressional houses on 1 October, a total of more than 7 billion dollars was allocated for the construction of military bases and other facilities in foreign states in fiscal year 1983.³

In the past year the American legislators did not give up their attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of the USSR's friends and allies. This is attested to by a resolution adopted by the Senate last fall, advising the U.S. Government to give "material aid" to Afghan counterrevolutionaries, and the provocative anti-Polish resolution, which was approved by the Congress just before the suspension of martial law by the Polish leadership.⁴

This is the general alignment of forces in U.S. ruling circles that was reflected in the Capitol "mirror."

But in addition to representing a "mirror," Congress also serves as a political barometer of the changing mood in American society. The powerful anti-war movement in the United States (and in Western Europe) and the resolute demands of broad segments of the American public for an end to the arms race and for the allocation of budget funds for the resolution of pressing economic and social problems influence the members of the 97th Congress. These factors help to strengthen the tendencies indicating growing doubts on Capitol Hill about the correspondence of the present administration's adventuristic line to U.S. national interests.

The stronger feelings in favor of limiting the growth of the Pentagon budget represented the most significant tendency on Capitol Hill in the past year. Several amendments to bills on military allocations, aimed at diverting some of the funds for military programs to the socioeconomic sphere, were introduced in both houses of the Congress and their committees throughout the summer and fall. Most of these amendments were rejected, but the militaristic groups in Congress were defeated in at least two cases.

On 9 September the House of Representatives overrode, by a majority of 184 (301 "for," 117 "against"), Ronald Reagan's veto of a bill on additional allocations for fiscal year 1982, which was drawing to a close at that time, envisaging the reduction of Pentagon appropriations by 2 billion dollars and the allocation of 918 million for social needs.⁵ It is indicative that the President's veto was voted down not only by Democrats, but also by 81 members of the Republican Party. The situation was similar during the vote of 10 September in the Senate, where Republicans represent the majority.⁶

The advocates of arms race escalation suffered another defeat in December during the discussion of the allocation of 988 million dollars for the acquisition of the first 5 (of the projected 100) MX missiles. The struggle between the administration and the Congress over this sum, which was so insignificant in comparison to the total military budget, was exceptionally heated.

The draft budget which was made public in February 1982 requested 4.5 billion dollars for the construction of 10 MX missiles in fiscal year 1983. Due to various internal conflicts, however, the U.S. Administration had not yet worked out a method for the permanent basing of the new missile system. In the fear that this might make Congress refuse to allocate the funds for a deployment, Ronald Reagan approved the plan to deploy the MX system by the "densepack" method in National Security Council Directive 35 on 17 May (100 missiles will be concentrated in reinforced silos located approximately 600 meters apart over a total area of around 12 square miles; 1 square mile = 2.5 square kilometers). White House spokesmen simultaneously implied that the administration would be deploying the MX missiles in existing silos until Congress had approved the plan and allocated the necessary funds.⁷

Nevertheless, the Senate Armed Services Committee voted to exclude the funds for the MX system from the draft military budget. On 16 August a congressional conference committee returned the 988 million dollars for the acquisition of the first 5 missiles to the budget, as well as 2.5 billion dollars for research and development in this field. It simultaneously prohibited the expenditure of a large portion of the funds until the administration had approved a plan for the permanent basing of the MX missiles.⁸ On 22 November Ronald Reagan informed the legislature that he had decided to deploy 100 MX missiles according to the "densepack" method on Francis Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming in special "hardened" silos.⁹

The administration launched an intensive campaign to convince congressmen and senators to allocate the requested funds: In particular, the President and the secretary of defense threatened to recall the American START delegation if the Capitol did not satisfy the administration's demand. As a result of this pressure, the amendment of Congressman J. Addabbo (Democrat, New York), envisaging the exclusion of the 988 million dollars for the acquisition of the first 5 MX missiles from the budget for fiscal year 1983, was actually rejected in the House Committee on Appropriations on 2 December, although the vote in the committee was a tie (26 to 26).¹⁰ But when the amendment was put to a second vote in the House at large, 245 congressmen voted to exclude these funds from the draft budget (176 voted against their exclusion); furthermore, 50 Republicans joined the 195 Democrats. This was a severe blow to the White House and the Pentagon. As the NEW YORK TIMES reported, "for the first time since World War II, one of the congressional houses voted to refuse the President a major type of weapon."¹¹

But this was not the end of the struggle. On 15 December the Senate Committee on Appropriations returned the 988 million dollars to the draft budget, and on 19 December a congressional conference committee canceled the allocation again. The final draft of the bill envisages the allocation of 2.5 billion dollars for research and development for the MX program and the authorization of additional funds for the purchase of missiles only after Congress has approved the method of their permanent basing.¹²

It appeared at first that the debates over the 988 million dollars concerned the MX basing method, with which many legislators were not satisfied (this is attested to, in particular, by the following incident: When the President

addressed the House of Representatives on 7 December and recalled that the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor on that date 41 years ago, J. Burton, Democrat from California, called this catastrophe the result of the "first densepack,"¹³ because the battleships that were destroyed by the Japanese bombers were in a chain formation in the harbor, and the planes were flying in a dense row).

An analysis of the debates over the 988 million dollars, however, indicate that the main issue was not so much the basing method as the understanding that this would mean the further intensification of militarism, with all of the ensuing consequences for U.S. domestic and foreign policy, and a giant step in the escalation of the arms race. In the discussion of this matter, the opponents of the MX system cited such arguments as, firstly, an increase in military spending (and the MX program will cost over 26 billion dollars) will hurt the American economy (in the words of, for example, M. Hatfield, "the real U.S. 'window of vulnerability' in the sphere of national security" is an "undermined economy," a "disintegrating infrastructure and the loss of competitive potential in international markets");¹⁴ secondly, regardless of the method of deployment, the MX system will not produce the results desired by the White House--it will neither "strengthen national security" nor make the United States militarily superior to the USSR. "There are valid doubts," said Senator A. Cranston (Democrat, California), "about our ability to ensure the deployment and functioning of this system before the Russians work out the means of its destruction."¹⁵ Thirdly, as Senator L. Pressler (Republican, South Dakota) said, the deployment of the MX system would violate existing Soviet-American SALT agreements, would escalate the arms race and military spending and would revive the danger of war. He was supported by Senators E. Kennedy, G. Hart and C. Levin (Democrat, Michigan). Congressman W. Green (Republican, New York) appeared to be summing up the results of all the opponents of the MX system when he said: "Regardless of the method of deployment, the MX program itself is a mistake from the military, social and economic standpoint."¹⁶

The freezing of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons on existing levels, for the purpose of their subsequent reduction, is regarded by broad segments of the U.S. public, including sensible congressmen, as an alternative to the buildup of American nuclear potential. The joint resolution introduced by E. Kennedy and M. Hatfield on 10 March 1982,¹⁷ as mentioned previously was rejected by the Reagan Administration's supporters in the Senate, who gave preference to the resolution of H. Jackson (Democrat, Washington) and J. Warner (Republican, Virginia), in accordance with which the nuclear weapons of the two sides would be frozen only after the correction of some kind of U.S. "strategic vulnerability"--or, in other words, after the United States is militarily superior to the Soviet Union. The Jackson-Warner resolution was supported by President Reagan himself and by such well-known "hawks" as Senators J. Tower (Republican, Texas), B. Goldwater (Republican, Arizona), D. Moynihan (Democrat, New York), J. Stennis (Democrat, Mississippi) and S. Thurmond (Republican, South Carolina).

In the lower house, the resolution of C. Zablocki (Democrat, Wisconsin), calling for a "mutual and verifiable freeze" on U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons, was defeated by only two votes (204 to 202),¹⁸ and this vote was

preceded by the approval of a similar stipulation in the resolution of J. Bingham (Democrat, New York) by a majority of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (26 to 11).

The question of a constructive U.S. approach to the freeze, however, certainly has not been removed from the agenda. The results of the midterm congressional elections on 2 November indicate that stormclouds are gathering over the Reagan Administration's approach to this matter. According to a poll of the members of the 97th and 98th Congresses, conducted by the NEW YORK TIMES newspaper and the CBS television company, the elections brought "more moderate liberal individuals" into the lower house of Congress. As a result, the overall balance of forces changed: Whereas 49 percent of the congressmen in the House of Representatives of the 97th Congress favored a freeze on Soviet and U.S. nuclear weapons, the figure is now 55 percent.¹⁹ A referendum held in connection with this matter on election day in the states of Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island and California (it was held earlier in Wisconsin) and in the cities of Washington, Philadelphia, Chicago, Miami, Denver, New Haven and others (in all around one-fourth of the U.S. population voted on this issue) indicated impressive support for the idea of freezing Soviet and U.S. nuclear arsenals at their present level without delay. This has given the supporters of the freeze reason to hope that a corresponding resolution will be approved when it is submitted to the new Congress.

As for the administration's approach to the START negotiations with the USSR and Congress' views on this matter, it appears that they should be examined within the context of the heightened activity of the advocates of constructive talks, reasonable compromises and consideration for the security interests of both sides. This is precisely the stance that was taken by Senators C. Mathias (Republican, Maryland), G. Hart, C. Percy (Republican, Illinois), A. Cranston, J. Chaffee (Republican, Rhode Island) and A. Specter (Republican, Pennsylvania) and Congressmen B. Bedell and T. Harkin (Democrats, Iowa), M. McHugh (Democrat, New York) and others when they demanded that the Reagan Administration resume the talks with the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic weapons. "In this time of uncertainty and heightened friction in the relations between the two superpowers," Chairman C. Zablocki of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs said on 1 March 1982, "it is absolutely necessary to avoid a costly and destabilizing race for nuclear arms with the Soviet Union. The statements that we must postpone arms control until we have closed the so-called 'window of vulnerability' should be replaced with the acknowledgment that there is a 'window of possibility' for control over nuclear weapons."²⁰

The debates over the Reagan Administration's position at the talks in Geneva revealed significant forces favoring the conduct of these talks with consideration for all positive results in this area in previous years and criticizing the President pointedly for his attempts to ignore the Soviet-American SALT agreements and other important agreements aimed at limiting the race for nuclear arms. The heightened activity of these groups in the Congress is attested to by the following, far from complete list of resolutions introduced on these matters:

On 21 April 1982 G. Hart submitted a resolution to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In the event of its adoption, it will express the Senate's opinion that the SALT II treaty would help to reduce the danger of nuclear war. "The ratification of the SALT II treaty would strengthen national security," he said, stressing that it would be necessary to "make use of what we have already achieved."²¹ On 22 June C. Zablocki proposed (in an amendment to his resolution on a U.S.-Soviet nuclear freeze) that the United States pledge to "ratify the SALT II treaty on the condition that existing possibilities for the verification of its fulfillment be maintained." Furthermore, he and Congressman J. Leach (Republican, Iowa) wanted this treaty to be ratified as an executive agreement--that is, by a simple majority of the vote in both houses of Congress. On 23 June the Foreign Affairs Committee approved his resolution along with the amendment, requesting the administration's "quick approval" of the SALT II treaty, although the proposal that the treaty be ratified as an executive agreement was defeated by a vote of 18 to 8.²² On 29 July the lower house adopted a resolution introduced by L. Aspin (Democrat, Wisconsin), in the form of an amendment to the bill on military appropriations for fiscal year 1983, prohibiting the allocation of funds for the creation, testing, purchase and deployment of any types of nuclear weapons which would violate the provisions of the SALT I and SALT II agreements. In the event of a departure from these provisions, the President, according to the resolution, would be obligated to prove to the Congress within 30 days that his actions were consistent with "basic national interests" and to explain the reasons for these actions.²³

Influential forces in the Congress also advocated other immediate measures to curb the nuclear arms race. In particular, in summer 1982 a group of 31 senators introduced a resolution in which they demanded that the Soviet-U.S. treaties of 1974 on underground nuclear tests and of 1976 on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes be transmitted by the President for ratification as soon as possible, and that the decision not to resume the talks with the USSR and Great Britain on a total and universal nuclear test ban be reconsidered.²⁴ A resolution introduced by Senator J. Danforth (Republican, Missouri) and 20 of his colleagues contained a similar appeal.²⁵

The opposition to administration policy by influential members of both parties was also apparent when Soviet-U.S. trade and economic relations were discussed by the 97th Congress in summer 1982. On 13 July 1982 C. Percy advocated the development of contacts in this field. Broader trade relations between the United States and the USSR were also favored by Chairman R. Dole of the Senate Finance Committee (Republican, Kansas), who had attended meetings of the Soviet-American Trade and Economic Council in Moscow on 16 and 17 November 1982.

The President's decision to prolong and considerably expand the ban on shipments of oil and gas equipment to the Soviet Union was subjected to harsh criticism in the Congress. On 1 August 1982, despite pressure from the White House, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs approved, by a vote of 22 to 12, a bill introduced by P. Findley (Republican, Illinois) and D. Bonker (Democrat, Washington) and aimed at the cancellation of the

discriminatory measures taken by the administration with regard to shipments of American equipment for the construction of the gasline between Siberia and Western Europe.²⁶

At a meeting of the House of Representatives on 30 September, however, the bill was defeated by the minimal majority characteristic of the second session of the 97th Congress (206 to 203). On the initiative of Congressman W. Broomfield (Republican, Michigan), the bill included an amendment stipulating that the sanctions would remain in force for 90 days after its enactment and would be canceled subsequently if the administration could not provide the Congress with any evidence of the use of "forced labor" in the construction of the gasline. In this form, the bill was approved by a vote of 209 to 197 and was then sent to the Senate.²⁷ Soon afterward, however, the White House itself lifted the sanctions under pressure from the Western European allies and from American business circles. This added considerable strength to the position of the legislators supporting mutually beneficial cooperation with the Soviet Union.

Therefore, it is clear that whenever major problems in American-Soviet relations were discussed in Congress--from the limitation of the arms race to the development of trade and economic relations--they invariably led to heated debates. And although it is a fact, as pointed out above, that the 97th Congress did not make a single decision to prevent the White House from pursuing a policy of confrontation with the USSR (on the contrary, its decisions actually signified approval of this policy), something else is also apparent: Forces opposing the administration's adventuristic foreign policy line are growing stronger in the Capitol. In December 1982, in the very last days of the congressional session, they started another battle with the White House by introducing the "Peace and Jobs" resolution of D. Edwards (Democrat, California) on behalf of 51 congressmen. The basic provisions of this resolution, which demanded that funds allocated to the Pentagon be used to combat unemployment, that the plans for "limited" and "protracted" nuclear wars be abandoned, that the development of such first-strike strategic systems as the MX, Pershing 2 and others be canceled and that relations with the Soviet Union be normalized, were supported by the inhabitants of 55 American cities. Various labor, social and religious organizations are preparing to organize a week of demonstrations in support of the resolution in the middle of April.²⁸

The stronger feelings in the Capitol in favor of the aversion of the danger of war, the normalization of international affairs and the improvement of American-Soviet relations were also attested to by the first weeks of work by the new Congress elected in November, particularly the resumption of the discussion of the U.S. position on the freeze--an important current issue.

"The overwhelming majority of states and increasingly broad segments of the world public now favor a nuclear freeze," the Political Declaration adopted by the Warsaw Pact countries in January 1983 notes. "A mutual freeze on the strategic weapons of the USSR and United States in the quantitative respect and the maximal restriction of their modernization could be one of the most significant steps toward the implementation of this idea."²⁹

FOOTNOTES

1. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 17 June 1982, p H3666.
2. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 22 December 1982.
3. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT (CQWR), 2 October 1982, p 2437.
4. Ibid., 9 October 1982, p 2670; THE WASHINGTON POST, 10 December 1982.
5. CQWR, 11 September 1982, p 2237.
6. Ibid.
7. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 21 May 1982.
8. CQWR, 21 August 1982, p 2061.
9. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 24 November 1982, p 1-2.
10. Ibid., 3 December 1982.
11. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 8 December 1982.
12. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 18-19, 21 December 1982.
13. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 8 December 1982.
14. Ibid., 24 November 1982.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., 23 November 1982.
17. CQWR, 3 April 1982, p 726.
18. Ibid., 7 August 1982, pp 1883-1884.
19. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 4 November 1982.
20. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 1 March 1982, p H534.
21. Ibid., 21 April 1982, p S3822.
22. CQWR, 26 June 1982, p 1516.
23. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 28 July 1982, p H4752.
24. Ibid., 30 July 1982, pp S9505-9507.
25. Ibid., p S9511.

26. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 11 August 1982.

27. CQWR, 2 October 1982, pp 2460, 2467.

28. PRAVDA, 21 December 1982.

29. Ibid., 7 January 1983.

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BOOK ON U.S. ECONOMIC FORECASTING REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 83
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[Review by Yu. I. Bobrakov and A. A. Poduzov of book "Ekonometricheskoye prognoziravaniye kapitalisticheskoy ekonomiki" [Econometric Forecasting of Capitalist Economics] by Yu. A. Chizhov and A. P. Yermilov, Novosibirsk, Nauka, Siberian Department, 1982, 177 pp]

[Text] The discerning analysis of American experience in modeling and forecasting processes of economic development in the United States and the disclosure of its strong and weak points represent one of the important functions of Soviet economic science. To date, however, this problem has not been discussed sufficiently in our literature. The work being reviewed is one of the few dealing with key aspects of this problem. Pointing out the differences between this new study and earlier works in this field, the author of the foreword, S. M. Men'shikov, writes that "the book by Yu. A. Chizhov and A. P. Yermilov is unique because the methodological premises they propose are the result of the summarization of the authors' practical experience with short-term macroeconometric forecasts of U.S. economics." The authors accumulated this experience in the process of independent analysis and through the use of two models of the American economy, one of which was published earlier,* while the second is presented in this new work. Besides this, the work reflects the forecasting achievements of prominent Soviet specialists I. V. Bestuzhev-Lada, D. M. Gvishiani, N. P. Fedorenko, Ye. M. Chetyrkin and some other researchers and contains discerning reassessments of the forecasting experiments of renowned foreign econometricians--L. Klein, H. Theil and R. Fair.

The accuracy of short-term (up to 2 years) forecasts of U.S. economics is one of the central topics of discussion. Explaining this choice of a forecasting time limit, the authors point out the fact that medium-range (2 to 5 years) and long-range (over 5 years) econometric forecasting has not been developed sufficiently as yet.

* Yu. A. Chizhov, "Model' ekonomiki SShA" [Model of U.S. Economy], Novosibirsk, 1977.

After choosing the gross national product as the forecasting indicator, the authors compared forecasts derived with the aid of seven American econometric models for accuracy, including the model of the Department of Commerce, the model of Data Resources Inc., the Wharton model, the model of R. Fair and others, and concluded that the models of the Wharton School and U.S. Department of Commerce had the best forecasting properties. The comparative analysis of econometric and non-econometric (expert) forecasts in the work testifies that econometric forecasts are superior not only in terms of accuracy but also in terms of the degree of correspondence between various forecasted indicators. At the same time, the authors correctly note that although econometric forecasts published in the United States are based on various mathematical models of the economy, they are always constructed with a view to qualitative factors and expert opinions, and it is therefore virtually impossible to discern their purely econometric input.

Analyzing the reasons for errors in econometric forecasts, the authors divide them into three groups. The first are defects in the initial statistics, the second are errors stemming from the measurement of exogenic variables without the aid of the model, and the third are mistakes connected with the flaws inherent in probability-statistical methods of measuring model parameters. The authors' calculations show that errors in initial data and in expert predictions of the dynamics of exogenic variables tend to lower the accuracy of forecasts considerably. The influence of methods of measuring model parameters on the accuracy of forecasts is connected with the choice of the base period for the assessment of the parameters and the determination of the natural tendencies reflected in the model. As a result, the authors conclude, the accuracy of forecasts rises as more recent statistics are used in assessing model parameters.

Their thorough analysis of the reasons for errors in econometric forecasts allow the readers to also determine the main ways of improving forecasting methods. In their opinion, there are two such ways. They are the dynamization of model coefficients of regression and the forecasting of incidental deviations of estimated economic indicators from the actual figures. Since model equations tend to become obsolete if the forecast period is too distant from the base period, they must be updated, or dynamized. One method of dynamization consists in the regular reassessment of all groups of parameters every 2 or 3 years. Another method--one worked out by the authors of the book--represents an improvement on the previous method and consists in extrapolating the movement of parameters on the basis of tendencies toward change in the past, disclosed during the process of subsequent reassessments. The second method--namely, the forecasting of incidental deviations--is based on a search for stable tendencies toward change in model errors.

The authors' conclusions are based on numerous calculations with the aid of their own models of the U.S. economy and models developed by leading American econometricians. The modeling experience accumulated in the Institute of the Economics and Organization of Industrial Production, Siberia Department, USSR Academy of Sciences, will be of great interest to economists concerned with problems in modeling and forecasting economic trends in capitalist countries.

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BOOK ON U.S. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO THIRD WORLD REVIEWED

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[Review by A. B. Parkanskiy of book "Amerikanskiy neokolonializm i peredacha tekhnologii" [American Neocolonialism and Technology Transfer] by R. I. Zimenkov, Moscow, Nauka, 1982, 223 pp]

[Text] The use of American advantages over the developing countries in the area of science and technology and the policy of technological neocolonialism have played an important role in U.S. measures to stimulate dependent capitalism in these countries. The ratio of total U.S. research and development expenditures to the expenditures of developing countries is 20:1, and the per capita ratio is around 181:1 (p 4).

One aspect of the U.S. policy of technological neocolonialism is the scientific and technical assistance that has been rendered since the 1950's and has generally been dictated by several economic and political conditions aimed at securing the interests of U.S. monopolistic capital. The author of this work states that the Reagan Administration is offering broader scientific and technical assistance to the developing countries on a bilateral basis; furthermore, this assistance is strictly selective in nature and is offered primarily to states supporting the policy of American imperialism (p 206).

Now that the balance of power in the international arena is changing in favor of socialism, transnational corporations have been assigned the central position in the pursuit of U.S. technological policy. They are expected to take charge of the development of new, more intense and longer-term "cooperation" with the developing countries. As long as the United States remains superior in the area of science and technology, this process is supposed to ensure American imperialism's impact on socioeconomic processes in the developing world and broaden its economic and technical dependence on more highly developed productive forces. "U.S. monopolistic capital is striving to turn the transfer of technical equipment and technology into a 'transfer' of private capitalist relations," the author says (p 209).

The author reveals the dual role of U.S. transnational corporations in the area of international technology transfer. On the one hand, they are unwittingly stimulating the internationalization of scientific and technical

knowledge and promoting the technical development of the newly liberated countries. On the other, the activities of transnational corporations are having an indisputably negative impact, slowing down the scientific and technical development of developing countries, deforming the technical base of their economy and cultivating industrial specialization inconsistent with their national goals. Besides this, the transmitted technology is generally insufficient in quantity, outdated in design and frequently incompatible with local requirements.

The author justifiably includes a detailed discussion of a practice with a destructive defect on economic, scientific and technical development in the young states--the practice of encouraging skilled specialists to go to work in the United States (p 157).

The selfish technology transfer policy of the United States, the author says, is doomed to eventual failure. As yet, however, it is slowing down socio-economic progress in the developing countries by impeding the formation of efficient national economic complexes and by keeping these countries on the periphery of world capitalism (p 164). The work contains a detailed discussion of the growing struggle of the newly liberated states for the normalization of technology transfer practices and their fights against imperialism in defense of their own national interests.

The author's comparative analysis of the cooperation of the USSR and other countries of the socialist community with the developing countries in the area of science and technology is of considerable interest (pp 183-190). The results of this cooperation, which is based on equality and mutual advantages, attest to its high level of effectiveness.

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BOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS REVIEWED

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[Review by N. B. Yaroshenko of book "Aktual'nyye problemy deyatel'nosti mezhdunarodnykh organizatsiy: teoriya i praktika" [Current Problems in the Activities of International Organizations: Theory and Practice], edited by G. I. Morozov, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1982, 351 pp]

[Text] This collective study was conducted for an extremely complex purpose: To summarize the experience of international organizations and reveal the common tendencies in their practices at a time when the existence of states belonging to different sociopolitical systems is a major factor in the world structure (p 23).

The information presented in this book tells how the actual influence and effectiveness of international organizations and their contribution to the resolution of today's major problems depend on the balance of political forces in these organizations. They represent a kind of mirror reflecting the overall world situation and the struggle between progressive and reactionary forces.

The authors cite numerous examples to demonstrate how the nature of the activities of international organizations changed after Great October under the influence of the Soviet Union's Leninist foreign policy and the peaceful policy of the socialist countries. No other state has offered mankind suggestions on major problems in international relations in recent years as serious and realistic as the proposals of the Soviet Union. This interesting study is concerned primarily with the foreign policy of the USSR and other socialist countries and with their constructive behavior in the international arena.

The authors have also made a considerable effort to demonstrate how reactionary forces in the capitalist countries, especially the United States, are trying to revive the "cold war" spirit in international relations, bury detente and accomplish the transition to open confrontation. A comprehensive scientific analysis of the activities of international organizations is extremely important today, now that imperialism is making particularly vigorous attempts to distort the facts about international events and denigrate the policy of the USSR and the entire socialist community. The

authors stress that the desire to make use of international organizations in the interest of any specific country or group of countries to the detriment of other states is inconsistent with the ideal of international cooperation and peaceful coexistence. They also expose attempts to substitute the idea of a "global supragovernmental administrative organization and demands for the renunciation of sovereignty by states" for the idea of equitable cooperation by sovereign states (p 11).

Despite the difficulties connected with the great number of international organizations (now over 3,000) and their great variety, the authors of this work have accomplished a sweeping analysis of the basic aspects of the activities of these organizations and the categorization of huge quantities of data.

The monograph is not the result of the mechanical unification of various aspects of activity by international organizations. The work is structured according to the chief goals of the group of authors. It offers a scientifically valid system for the categorization of international organizations primarily on the basis of their political essence, their compliance with the standards of international law and the purposes of their activity.

The authors' division of international organizations into interstate or intergovernmental and non-governmental bodies seems important. The authors are particularly interested in the activities of non-governmental organizations, and this is understandable: The involvement of increasingly broad segments of the public in conscious political activity is a distinctive feature of contemporary international life (p 312). The latest tendencies in the development of these organizations and their positive contribution to the consolidation of world peace are discussed in detail. This contribution has been augmented considerably by the rising international prestige of non-governmental organizations.

The network of present-day international organizations is complex and contradictory. This lends even more importance to the service performed by the authors, who set themselves the extremely difficult task of determining the place and significance of international organizations in the practice of international relations.

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BOOK ON U.S. TRADE UNIONS REVIEWED

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[Review by I. A. Geyevskiy of book "Profsoyuzy v amerikanskom obshchestve (60--70-ye gody)" [Labor Unions in American Society (1960's-1970's)] by V. A. Zlenko, Kiev, Naukova dumka, 1981, 190 pp]

[Text] When the Reagan Administration launched its attack on the standard of living, democratic rights and social gains of the American laboring public, the labor unions headed the largest joint demonstration by various democratic organizations in U.S. history--the Day of Unity (19 September 1981). Several unions campaigned against candidates with antilabor views in 1982. The increased role of labor unions in sociopolitical life makes the subject of this review particularly pertinent.

The book is a thorough study of the historical roots of the U.S. labor movement and the current tendencies in its development. The author discusses the status of the working class in the social structure of American society and its role in the struggle against the monopolies and logically reviews the statements of bourgeois ideologists about the "integration" and "deproletarianization" of the working class.

The complex internal processes occurring within the U.S. labor movement in the last two decades, especially the radicalization of this movement and the formation of its left wing, are analyzed in the work. These matters are particularly important because, as the author correctly notes, "bourgeois analysts tend to study only phenomena occurring in the upper echelons of labor unions.... Tendentiously denigrating the role of the broad popular masses in the process of societal development and ignoring the struggle of tendencies in the American labor movement and the increasingly loud protests of rank-and-file union members, bourgeois authors write a onesided, distorted history of the labor movement and analyze only the particular features that illustrate the conciliatory practices of labor leaders" (pp 18-19).

In addition to pointing out positive changes in the labor unions, the author discusses the objective and subjective difficulties encountered by the movement. He examines the peculiarities of the formation of unions, the factors inhibiting their growth (they unite only one-fifth of the laboring

public), their undemocratic structure and other factors diminishing the potential strength of the U.S. working class.

In his analysis of the foreign policy stance of labor unions, the author proves that rightwing labor leaders, who are obsessed with anticommunism and anti-Sovietism, are essentially connected with various segments of ruling circles. The AFL-CIO foreign policy staff "interacts with the State Department and other government agencies operating in the international arena" (p 117). The unseemly role of several rightwing labor leaders has recently been demonstrated quite clearly in their active involvement in Washington's subversive activity against socialist Poland.

The book was compiled in the Institute of the Social and Economic Problems of Foreign Countries, Ukraine SSR Academy of Sciences. This young institute has already prepared and published several thorough studies of the current problems of contemporary capitalism within the few years of its existence.

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BOOK ON GROWTH, INFLUENCE OF TNC'S REVIEWED

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[Review by L. N. Karpov of book "Transnatsional'nyye korporatsii i obostreniye kapitalisticheskikh protivorechiy" [Transnational Corporations and the Exacerbation of Capitalist Contradictions] by S. Yu. Medvedkov, Moscow, Mysl', 1982, 245 pp]

[Text] The subject of this review is an analysis of a broad group of problems engendered by the growth of transnational corporations, and especially the American TNC's, which are the most powerful of these new international monopolies. This book by S. Yu. Medvedkov, which is the latest in a series of works by Soviet scholars on this subject matter, is distinguished, we feel, by the originality of its research methodology, calculations and estimates, the inclusion of new and as yet little researched problems, and the internal logic which is clearly reflected in the author's analysis of various matters.

The work begins with a discussion of the natural tendencies in the internationalization of capital. On the basis of Marxist-Leninist methodology, the author determines the reasons for the relative decline in the significance of foreign trade and the growing importance of the production of the overseas branches of monopolies in their struggle for the world market. His analysis of the causes and basic stages of the expanded circulation of capital outside national boundaries, based on the theories of Marx and Lenin, reveals the shortcomings of bourgeois ideas about the growth of TNC's, including the theory of the "life cycle" of goods, which is so popular in the West.

An interesting part of the book is the section in which the author examines the history of today's TNC's, distinguishing between general and particular features in the development of international monopolies from the beginning of the century to the present time. This serves as a basis for a more precise description of the distinctive features of the present stage in the international expansion of capital and, what is equally important, the prediction of probable trends in the development of TNC's and possible changes in their activities in the future.

A large section of the book deals with the characteristics and contradictions of TNC's in the 1970's and early 1980's. Their behavior is analyzed with a view to signs of crisis in the capitalist economy and with the changing situation in the young states. The author demonstrates how the uneven development of the capitalist countries has brought about changes in the balance of power among the three centers of imperialism and in the nature, forms and fields of their rivalry. The loss of the undisputed leadership of the American TNC's in the struggle for "economic territory" and for world capitalist markets has escalated, as the author demonstrates, centripetal tendencies in the relations between the American Government and the monopolies and has led to the even closer interconnection of their imperialist, hegemonist interests. This became particularly evident when the Reagan Administration took charge (p 99).

The author associates questions connected with the administrative workings, strategy and tactics of the global operation of American TNC's with the attempts made in recent years by many U.S. corporations to optimize their global business and adapt their business activity to the changing conditions of overseas operations. From this vantage point, the author describes the administrative innovations of the TNC's, the modification in ownership policy and new features in methods of supervising overseas branches, organizing research and technology transfer and financing overseas operations.

Global reorganization within the mechanism of international expansion has been capital-unique reaction to the abrupt exacerbation of contradictions within the economic organism of the TNC's and in their diverse relations with the "outside world"--rival companies, the governments of host countries (especially in the developing states), etc. These contradictions, the author says, are reflected in particular in the struggle between two tendencies--the organization of TNC activity according to plan and the increasingly uneven and haphazard development of the capitalist economy--and sometimes in the relations between the executives of TNC's and branches (p 108).

The influence of TNC activity on the economies of the developed capitalist and developing countries is examined in a special chapter. The author underscores the influence of the TNC's on socioeconomic life in these countries in the 1970's and 1980's. They include the equalization of previously sizable differences in the implications of TNC activity for the United States on the one hand and for the leading West European countries and Japan on the other as a result of the transformation of the latter into active exporters of productive capital. Besides this, as the author points out, the production base of American TNC's in the United States no longer plays its earlier, clearly defined role of the "center," supplemented by the "periphery" of overseas branches.

In his examination of the influence of the TNC's on the national economy of the United States and other leading capitalist countries and the developing states, the author discusses such objects and parameters of influence as scientific and technical progress, employment, capital investment dynamics and the foreign trade and international payment status of these countries.

He gives the necessary consideration to the specific features of the socio-economic implications of activity by foreign capital in various parts of the world capitalist economy (p 210).

The monograph ends with a concise description of the types and nature of conflicts engendered by TNC activity. The author conducts a discerning analysis of the formal attempts of Western governments to set "rigid" standards of TNC behavior while simultaneously opposing the elaboration of truly effective measures to regulate TNC activity within the UN framework.

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ROLE OF NATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANT IN ADMINISTRATION DISCUSSED

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[Article by S. I. Lobanov: "The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs"]

[Text] The intensification of signs of crisis in American imperialism's foreign policy is attested to in particular by "malfunctions" in the work of the U.S. foreign policy mechanism. In 1982 the "shaky partnership" in the upper echelon of the Reagan Administration became particularly evident. The resignation of the two leading administration officials responsible for making and conducting foreign policy--National Security Adviser R. Allen and Secretary of State A. Haig--conclusively refuted the official Washington statements about the total unanimity in the current American leadership. These assurances could not conceal the serious worries in U.S. ruling circles about the actual state of affairs.

This is attested to, in particular, by the recent appearance of numerous analytical articles about problems in the functioning of the U.S. foreign policy mechanism, especially its highest link--the National Security Council. Many of these articles deal directly with the activities and functions of the assistant to the President for national security affairs and discuss the style and content of his work and the limits of his authority. After all, this office is justifiably regarded as one of the key positions in the U.S. foreign policy establishment.

The office of the President's national security assistant was established in 1953 by President D. Eisenhower (between 1953 and 1959 the official title of the position was "special assistant to the President for national security affairs." Prior to this, since 1947, there had been the position of NSC executive secretary, who was, according to the definition of S. Sowers, the first to occupy this position, only "an anonymous council employee").¹ The authority and influence granted by this position have been expanded considerably in past decades.² This has been a gradual process and its basic stages have essentially coincided with the changes in governing parties.

Between 1953 and 1961 the President's national security assistant played a fairly unobtrusive role, obviously subordinate to leading foreign policy officials, especially Secretary of State J. F. Dulles.

The influence and authority of the President's assistant were augmented considerably with the start of the Kennedy Administration. It was at that time that M. Bundy and W. Rostow began to push Secretary of State D. Rusk to the sidelines of the foreign policy process.

Finally, the current stage in this evolution began at the time of President Nixon's reorganization of the NSC in 1969. This reorganization was called the "rebirth of the NSC system" by American experts.³ Council committees and groups were reinstated as instruments for the elaboration, coordination and supervision of U.S. foreign policy, and there was a corresponding increase in the role of the presidential assistant as the head of the NSC staff. Presidential Assistant H. Kissinger, who occupied this office from January 1969 to November 1975 and personally headed most of its committees and groups, including the particularly important Senior Review Group, actually became the chief "architect" of American foreign policy by pushing Secretary of State W. Rogers completely into the background and then essentially forcing him to resign. However, when Lt-Gen B. Scowcroft of the U.S. Air Force was the President's assistant during the concluding stage of the Republicans' period in power, under the Ford Administration, he did not play an independent role in making and conducting national security policy: This sphere was dominated, just as it had been in the past, by Kissinger, who had become Secretary of State by that time.

The "collective" approach to U.S. foreign policy making, declared as a basic principle by the Carter Administration, quickly turned into a fierce confrontation between National Security Adviser Z. Brzezinski and Secretary of State C. Vance. This confrontation concerned many key aspects of international relations and it continued, although perhaps in less acute form, after E. Muskie became secretary of state.⁴

The influence Brzezinski had on the most important foreign policy decisions by the end of the Carter Administration acquired such dimensions that Senator E. Zorinsky from Nebraska remarked: "Everyone knows we have two secretaries of state."⁵ A change in the procedure of appointing the presidential assistant, in such a way that the appointment would be made with the "advice and consent" of the Senate, seemed to the senator to be the natural solution to the problem. But the amendment he introduced in 1979 with regard to this matter was defeated after hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in April 1980.⁶

The shortcomings of the foreign policy decisionmaking process under the Carter Administration were pointedly criticized by Republican leaders during the 1980 campaign.

The measures taken on President Reagan's orders at the beginning of 1981 to reorganize the foreign policymaking mechanism lowered the status of the assistant to the President for national security affairs and his staff. This is attested to by the mere fact that the President's first national security assistant, R. Allen, was accountable to presidential Counselor E. Meese, and this demoted him to the level of deputy secretary in the political context, while the official status of his predecessors was equivalent to

secretarial status. Besides this, the coordination of policy at times of international crisis was excluded from the presidential assistant's functions. He was also deprived of an important instrument of political leverage--the chairmanship of one of the main interdepartmental NSC committees.

On 4 January 1982 President Reagan announced the appointment of his new assistant for national security affairs, W. Clark, formerly deputy secretary of state. He replaced R. Allen, who had resigned. The President's decision did not come as a surprise: At the beginning of November 1981 the American press was already reporting plans for changes in the foreign policy leadership.

William Patrick Clark was born in 1931. He is one of the President's closest political colleagues and a native Californian. He has a law degree and had a private legal practice for many years. Between 1967 and 1969 he was Ronald Reagan's chief of staff when Reagan was the governor of California. Between 1969 and 1981 Clark was a district attorney, an appellate court judge and then a justice of the Supreme Court of the State of California. After the Republican victory in the 1980 presidential election, he was appointed deputy secretary of state. Although Clark did not display the necessary knowledge of world politics (evoking a vast amount of criticism in the American press) during hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on his nomination, the appointment was approved. Clark has close ties with several top administration officials. For example, 15 years ago E. Meese and M. Deaver were under his direct jurisdiction when they served respectively as the governor of California's secretary on legal matters and the governor's deputy chief of staff. Another of Clark's old friends is current U.S. Secretary of Defence C. Weinberger.⁷

After Clark's appointment, the status of the President's national security assistant changed considerably. Clark has much more power over the elaboration, coordination and implementation of U.S. foreign policy than his predecessors. In contrast to R. Allen, W. Clark is accountable directly to the President. When he arrived in the White House, the American press reported that the "big three" on the White House staff had been replaced by a "big four." And the resignation of A. Haig, who wanted to act as the President's "deputy" in the foreign policy sphere, from the office of secretary of state established even more favorable conditions for the growth of Clark's political and administrative influence.

American political scientists have made a considerable effort to determine the reasons why the office of national security assistant has become an apple of discord in the U.S. foreign policy mechanism.⁸ They see these reasons in the specific functions performed by the assistant and in the resources at his disposal for the performance of these functions.

The assistant's main areas of activity are, firstly, the administration of the decisionmaking process in the NSC and, secondly, the performance of the role of presidential adviser on foreign policy matters (of course, in the real world of politics these spheres do not exist in isolation but are closely interconnected).

As the chief "executive" of the NSC system, the President's assistant prepares the agenda for council meetings and informs members of concerned departments and agencies of the meeting schedule, organizes briefings for the President on key aspects of national security, supervises the inter-departmental foreign policy research process, informs concerned agencies of presidential decisions and oversees their implementation.

As the influence of the President's assistant for national security affairs grew, however, these functions as a coordinator, a middleman, the head of the "President's operational staff" and the individual responsible for facilitating the decisionmaking process on the top level, were replaced more and more by other functions stemming from his other role as an adviser conducting "his own" line (this was particularly characteristic of H. Kissinger and Z. Brzezinski). He defended it in talks with the President and in interdepartmental arguments, organizing broad-scale media campaigns to popularize his own line and taking every opportunity to bring it to the attention of the U.S. Congress and representatives of foreign states.

The considerable influence of the President's national security assistant is secured primarily by the President's need for a personal "agent" with whose assistance he can control the work of all links of the foreign policy mechanism. "The actual structure of the highest administrative echelons," D. Rusk said, "is nothing like the one you read about in textbooks and see in diagrams. It depends on the distribution of presidential confidence."⁹ The authority with which a president endows his assistant determines the latter's actual status in the Washington political hierarchy.

The presidential assistant performs his duties with the aid of his subordinates, the members of the NSC staff, whose functions consist in the investigation of specific issues on the council agenda, the collection and analysis of information on matters the assistant plans to discuss with the President and the performance of a number of duties connected with interdepartmental coordination.

In the 1970's there was a tendency toward the reduction of the NSC staff. For example, whereas in Kissinger's time there were more than 50 specialists on the average on this staff (excluding auxiliary personnel), in Brzezinski's time there were around 40, and 21 had doctorates. The overwhelming majority of the experts received their degrees from universities for the privileged class--Columbia, Harvard, Princeton, Stanford and Johns Hopkins. There was a high percentage of staffers who had previously worked for agencies of the executive or legislative branches.¹⁰

The staff headed by Z. Brzezinski was made up of regional and functional groups. The former were groups for Western Europe, the Middle East, Eastern Europe and USSR, the Far East and "North-South" affairs, and the latter were groups for the coordination of defense policy, intelligence coordination, international economic affairs, global affairs and science. There were press and congressional liaisons.¹¹ This structure established a natural organization basis for rivalry between the NSC staff and the State Department. Brzezinski energetically made use of this rivalry to establish his own influence in the foreign policy mechanism.

The organizational structure of the NSC staff has apparently undergone only insignificant changes under the Reagan Administration. According to the data of NATIONAL JOURNAL, there are six regional and five functional groups, each of which is headed by a director with from two to seven assistants. The group on "North-South" affairs has been replaced by groups on African and Latin American affairs, and the functional groups now include one on security assistance and legislative affairs. The NSC advance crisis planning group, which is headed by the President's national security assistant, is one of Clark's innovations.¹²

There are now 37 specialists on the NSC staff, almost two-thirds of whom have previous experience in public administration. The annual NSC budget is around 4 million dollars and its total staff, including auxiliary personnel, numbers around 100. The top staffers include conservative scholars who once worked for the Department of Defense, the CIA and the State Department. They include Adm John Poindexter and Maj-Gen (Ret) Richard Bovary. The top military ranks were also represented on the NSC staff by RAdm (Ret) James Nance, former commander of the aircraft carrier "Forrestal," who left the council staff last year. Prior to Clark's appointment, James Nance was the deputy assistant to the President for national security affairs. In January 1982 he was replaced by Robert McFarlane, State Department counselor and former NSC staffer. McFarlane, former secretary of the Air Force T. Reed and J. Poindexter make up the executive link of the NSC staff. Academic circles are represented in the NSC by Geoffrey Kemp, an expert on Middle East affairs (from the Taft University School of Law and Diplomacy) Roger Fontaine, expert on Latin America from the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, Orientologist Gaston Segur from George Washington University, world economics expert Henry Nau (George Washington University) and several others.¹³ In January 1982 several new staffers arrived from the State Department.

The people now in charge in the White House are continuing to give serious attention to the organization and activities of the NSC staff. In November 1981 presidential counselor E. Meese ordered the creation of a special group, made up of representatives of the White House, State Department and Department of Defense, to study the structure and functioning of the NSC. It was headed by James Jenkins, Meese's deputy.¹⁴ When Clark took office as the presidential national security assistant, he enlisted the services of three prominent conservatives as temporary advisers on the reorganization of the NSC staff--Claire Booth Luce (who was once a member of the House of Representatives and the ambassador to Italy) as the adviser on detente, William Buckley (one of the best-known conservative ideologists) as the adviser on policy planning, and the abovementioned Thomas Reed as the adviser on defense.¹⁵ (They ceased to be NSC advisers after they had completed their assignments.) The political image of these individuals attests quite clearly to the outlook that now prevails in the NSC.

The materials of the 26th CPSU Congress note: "The difficulties being experienced by capitalism are also affecting its policy, including its foreign policy. The struggle over basic aspects of the foreign policy line of the capitalist countries is growing more intense."¹⁶ The struggle within

the U.S. foreign policy establishment is conclusive proof of the accuracy of this statement. There is every reason to regard the intensification of this struggle as a long-range tendency, objectively produced by the external and internal conditions of American politics.

American political scientists are working on diagrams, models and "ideal" organizational structures approximating their idea of an efficient decision-making mechanism. The administrators of the foreign policy mechanism are trying to correct the situation by means of reorganization and administrative reform. No such reorganization, however, has produced the desired results to date.

FOOTNOTES

1. L. Bloomfield, "The Foreign Policy Process. A Modern Primer," Englewood Cliffs, 1982, p 46.
2. A bibliography on this matter can be found in the following books: E. Plischke, "U.S. Foreign Relations: A Guide to Information Sources," Detroit, 1980; M. Lowenthal, "The National Security Council: Organizational History," Washington, 1978.
3. For more detail, see "SShA: vneshnepoliticheskiy mekhanizm. Organizatsiya, funktsii, upravleniye" [The U.S. Foreign Policy Mechanism. Organization, Functions and Management], edited by Yu. A. Shvedkov, Moscow, 1972, pp 58-68.
4. L. Gelb, "Muskie and Brzezinski: The Struggle Over Foreign Policy," THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, 20 July 1980, pp 26-40.
5. THE WASHINGTON POST, 11 May 1979.
6. "The National Security Adviser: Role and Accountability," Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Washington, 1980, p 1.
7. "Nomination of Justice William Patrick Clark," Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Washington, 1981, p 4; U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 2 March 1981, p 36.
8. See, in particular, A. George, "Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice," Boulder (Colorado), 1980, pp 195-200; A. Cyr, "The National Security Assistant: Helmsman, Captain or First Mate," ATLANTIC COMMUNITY QUARTERLY, Spring 1982, pp 74-85; B. Rockman, "America's Department of State: Irregular and Regular Syndroms of Policy Making," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, December 1981, pp 911-927.

9. I. Destler, "National Security Management: What Presidents Have Wrought," POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, Winter 1980/81, p 575.
10. "The National Security Adviser," p 51; I. Destler, Op. cit., p 576; ARMED FORCES JOURNAL, July 1977, pp 12-20.
11. "The National Security Adviser," p 51.
12. NATIONAL JOURNAL, 17 July 1982, p 1246.
13. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 9 March 1981; 21 January 1982; NATIONAL JOURNAL, 25 April 1981, p 688; B. Rockman, Op. cit., p 924.
14. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 6 December 1981.
15. Ibid., 21 January 1982.
16. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU CONGRESS], Moscow, 1981, p 20.

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